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ABSTRACT 
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cost of ethnic conflict is overwhelming. Ernest Regehr wrote in 1993 that almost two-
thirds of political conflicts worldwide were ethnic conflicts. Although ethnic conflict is a 
worldwide phenomenon, it is not fate. Unlike the many unfortunate ones, some ethnically 
divided nations have successfully lived together without giving rise to widespread 
bloodshed or forceful repression. Potential fault lines between parties have been 
reengineered and tensions have been regulated. In this study, the central question is 
focused on governmental policies as a tool to prevent conflict. Contrary to the general 
perception, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts are political. As a political problem, it 
can be exacerbated or moderated by governmental policies or the lack of such policies. 
This thesis study has three main parts. In the first part, Daniel Byman’s four 
causes of ethnic conflicts are discussed. In the second part, I recommend a solution in the 
form of a coherent four-fold framework consisting of “population control,” “winning 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Every day, since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, hundreds of innocent Iraqis are 
losing their lives due to ongoing sectarian violence. The bombing of the Al-Askariya 
mosque in the Iraqi city of Samara was more than enough to trigger the bloody ethnic 
conflict. Now, while both coalition and Iraqi security forces conduct counterinsurgency 
warfare within that country, scholars around the world have put Iraq on the operating 
table, asking how a multiethnic Iraq can survive. 
Many scholars have generated theoretical and empirical studies on the causes and 
consequences of communal strife. Using the work of these scholars, I found that ethnic 
conflict is neither the norm nor a certain fate in some multiethnic nations. I therefore raise 
the question, “Can governments prevent ethnic conflict through policy development and 
enforcement?” Of the more than two hundred nation-states in the world, few are 
ethnically homogenous; nearly all bear the mark of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity.1 
Among over two hundred sovereign states, it has been estimated that there are four 
thousand ethnocultural entities.2 Forty percent contain five or more such communities, 
and fewer than a third have a single ethnic majority.3 Some, such as India and Nigeria, 
possess over one hundred ethnocultures. Others, such as Belgium, Fiji, Guyana, Northern 
Ireland, and Trinidad, are ethnically bipolar.4 Relations among these ethnic groups have 
varied dramatically. 
While some of the multiethnic states are on the radar screen of the international 
community because of oppression, violent ethnic conflict, and human rights violations, 
others enjoy the benefits of diversity, such as different skill sets, interests, and cultures.  
                                                 





However, the cost of ethnic conflict is overwhelming. Worldwide, between 1900 
and 1987, 170 million human beings were murdered by their own governments.5 These 
victims of internal conflicts by far outnumber those of wars between sovereign nation-
states over the same period. Ernest Regehr wrote in 1993 that almost two-thirds of 
political conflicts worldwide were ethnic conflicts.6 Moreover, constitutionally 
democratic regimes in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Nigeria were destroyed and torn apart by 
ethnic conflict that led to civil war. The costs of ethnic conflict are devastating in terms 
of human lives and economics. 
In contrast, some ethnically divided societies have managed to resolve the 
problem satisfactorily. Belgium was faced with a severe church-and-state conflict from 
1830 to 1958 and from the 1950s to the 1980s was also wracked by a highly charged 
linguistic and territorial conflict between Flemings and Walloons.7 The Netherlands lived 
through an intense church-and-state conflict involving Protestants, Catholics, and 
secularists in the first quarter of the 20th century.8 In Malaysia, Malays and Chinese have 
clashed over economic, religious, linguistic, symbolic, and political issues since that 
country achieved its independence from the United Kingdom in 1957.  
Although ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon, it is not fate. Some 
ethnically divided nations have successfully lived together without giving rise to 
widespread bloodshed or forceful repression. Potential fault lines between parties have 
been reengineered and tensions have been regulated. In this study, the central question is 
focused on governmental policies as a tool to prevent conflict. Contrary to the general 
perception, the vast majority of ethnic conflicts are political. As a political problem, I 
argue that ethnic conflict can be either moderated or exacerbated by governmental 
policies or the lack of such policies. 
 
                                                 
5 The calculations were made by RJ Rummel and quoted in Theo Tshuy 1997, Ethnic Conflict and 
Religion: Challenge to the Churches, p. 19-20. 
6 Ernest Regehr, quoted in John Paul Lederach, “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in 
Divided Societies,” 1995, p. 7. 
7 Eric A Nordlinger, “Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies,” 1972, p. 19. 
8 Ibid. 
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A. THE FRAMEWORK 
Upon studying a number of ethnic conflicts and conflict resolution models, from 
David Horowitz’s massive comparative study, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), Eric 
Nordlinger’s Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (1972), Daniel Byman’s Keeping 
Peace (2002), I conclude that the model Byman discusses in his book is the one most 
closely related to my thesis argument. I have used Byman’s model as a point of departure 
and modified it in order to answer my thesis question. 
One way to understand ethnic conflict prevention is to explore the causes of the 
conflict. Ethnic groups fight for many reasons, ranging from financial motives to cultural 
values that glorify war and feuding.9 Four causes of ethnic conflict are singled out, 
however, both for their frequency and virulence.10 Specifically, these are security fears, 
here defined as “security dilemmas,” status concerns, desire for hegemony, and 
leadership ambitions. 
After discussing these leading causes of ethnic conflict, I recommend a solution in 
a coherent four-fold framework. First, security must be maintained and enforced 
impartially. Security is a primary concern of human beings; if threatened, even the most 
peace-loving societies may resort to violence. Second, population support should be 
maintained during sensitive transition periods. Third, a national identity that embraces all 
parts of a society should be reinforced by indirect means. Last but not least, ethnic 
minorities should be encouraged to advance their positions through participation in 
democratic processes. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This study includes eight chapters, each focusing on a different aspect of the 
framework discussed earlier. In Chapter II, I define the following leading causes of ethnic 
conflict: security fears, status concerns, the desire for hegemony, and leadership 
ambitions. In Chapter III, I begin my discussion of the proposed “four-fold framework” 
by addressing the security concerns of ethnic groups. Providing security for every 
                                                 
9 Byman, p.14. 
10 Ibid. 
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segment of the population rises as a pillar of the model. A secure environment not only 
eases tensions between ethnic parties but also facilitates the satisfactory performance of 
other policy tools.  
Government can prevent ethnic conflict by gaining and maintaining the support of 
all the ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict prevention is a time-consuming process. It cannot be 
achieved overnight through enthusiastic political speeches. It needs to go trough stages: 
infancy, adolescence, and adulthood.11 Thus, in Chapter IV, I discuss the value of 
“winning hearts and minds.” 
Government can also promote a national identity. The integration of all ethnic 
groups to a common cause absolutely reduces the risk of violent conflict.12 Indisputably, 
many of the ethnically diverse nations of Europe in the 19th century emerged as nation-
states in the 20th century. In the developing world, like Africa and the Middle East, 
however, attempts at nation building have often led to bitter conflict and have actually 
increased ethnic tensions.13 I explore this phenomenon in Chapter V. 
A fair political system that enables the participation of all ethnic groups can bring 
the expectations and complaints of all parties into the legal arena. Participation can help 
groups sort out their differences that would otherwise likely lead to violence. However, in 
deeply divided societies, elections often lead to tyrannies of the majority or other 
undemocratic results. I study the merits of reengineering political systems in Chapter VI. 
In Chapter VII, after building the pillars of the framework, I apply this model to 
current day Iraq as a test.  
                                                 




II. CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 
Many policymakers and journalists believe that the causes of ethnic conflicts are 
simple and straightforward.14 The driving forces behind violent ethnic conflicts, it is said, 
are the “ancient hatreds” that many ethnic groups have for each other.15 While writing 
about the Balkans, the American political commentator Richard Cohen declared, “Bosnia 
is a formidable, scary place of high mountains, brutish people and tribal grievances 
rooted in the history and the myth born of boozy nights by fire. It is the place where 
World War I started and where wars of Europe persist, an ember of hate still glowing for 
reasons that defy reason itself.”16   
Some scholars, such as David Horowitz and Eric Nordflinger, argue that this 
explanation of ethnic conflict is too simple and cannot explain why violent conflicts have 
broken out in some places, but not others. It also cannot explain why some disputes are 
more violent and harder to resolve than others.17  
Rather than relegating causes of conflict to “ancient hatreds,” examining selected 
causes in the first place will help us to develop a framework to prevent ethnic conflict. By 
understanding the causes of ethnic conflict, we are better able to prevent, counter, or live 
with it.18  
Many scholars have developed different theories as to the causes of ethnic 
conflicts. Some of them emphasize economic and geographic problems. Others argue that 
problematic group histories are an important cause of conflict.19 Byman (2002) identifies 
and describes several theories of ethnic conflict: ethnic security dilemma, status concern, 
hegemonic ambitions, and elite aspirations. I will discuss these causes in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Michael E. Brown, “The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” MIT Press 1996, p. 1-31. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Richard Cohen, “Send in the Troops,” Washington Post, November 28, 1995. 




A. ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA 
All humans have basic needs according to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 
Safety/security is the most important need, after food, water, and shelter, which are 
necessary for survival. When there is no overarching authority to provide security for 
society, people might resort to violence or seek to arm themselves for their survival. This 
is usually framed in terms of anarchy. Once trust is eroded between parties, they start to 
mobilize themselves, even in the wake of relatively peaceful periods. Competition often 
continues to a point at which competing ethnic groups have garnered more power than 
needed for security, and consequently begin to threaten others.20 This is called the 
“security dilemma.” What one group does to enhance its own security causes a reflective 
reaction from their adversary or competition that, in the end, can make the group less 
secure.21 
 When a society falls into the paradox of a security dilemma, ethnic groups who 
may have lived in harmony for many years under legitimate authority suddenly view each 
other with suspicion, interpreting each act as a threat. For example, in Yugoslavia, 
disintegration of central authority led directly to interethnic conflict and destroyed the 
Balkans while inflicting a large number of human losses throughout the 1990s. It is 
tempting to blame interethnic hatreds, ancient feuds, and conflicts over identity to explain 
conflicts within or among the former Yugoslav Republics. But as Michael Ignatief 
argues, Serbs, Croats and Muslims lived in relative harmony for most of the 20th century. 
There were high rates of intermarriage, they lived in the same villages, and attended 
many of the same schools. What turned friends and neighbors into enemies was the 
power vacuum that emerged with Tito’s death. Without central government to ensure 
order and guarantee personal security, people became afraid. As Ignatieff continues, 
“Once the Yugoslav Communist state began to spin apart into its constituent national 
particles, a key question soon became: Will the local Croat policemen protect me if I am 
a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new boss is a Serb or Muslim? The 
answer to these questions was no, because no state remained to enforce the old 
                                                 




interethnic bargain.22  Although ethnic differences and distrust played a role in the rise of 
the conflict, these causes would not have led to full-fledged war without the collapse of 
authority. 
A necessary condition for the ethnic security dilemma to operate among ethnic 
groups is that they must have a reason to fear one another or at least to be uncertain about 
other groups’ intentions.23 After all, in theory, a group might welcome armed neighbors 
if they believed they would fight by their side against other unsavory elements.24 Byman 
argues that in Lebanon, for example, Sunni Muslim groups did not fear the increasingly 
armed Palestinian presence in the country, as they believed that the Palestinians would 
help them fight Christians, Druze, and other Lebanese rivals in the event of a conflict.25 
However, a security dilemma is not the only source of conflict. Although I argued 
previously that many scholars do not welcome “ancient hatreds” as a cause of ethnic 
strife, it is hard to ignore the past. When societies were built, economic and structural 
advantages might have been formed not favored of one group over another (e.g., 
representation in the executive branch). Eventually, social disequilibrium would raise 
tensions among the different ethnic groups. One of the many factors that fuel social 
disequilibrium is concern over ethnic status.  
B. ETHNIC STATUS CONCERN 
The Security dilemma is not the only factor that leads ethnic groups to struggle. 
One of the prominent causes of conflict is the relative position\status of one group over 
another. Societies tend to seek equilibrium. People on both sides of the spectrum question 
what they want from their government and to what they are entitled. If the differences 
among members of different groups are wide enough to sharpen disequilibrium, people 
start to question authority. Points of disequilibrium mostly involve recognition of 
religious and language rights, equal economic opportunity, and political representation. 
                                                 
22 Michael Ignatief, “Blood and Belonging: Journeys into New Nationalism,” 1993, p.42. 




In the Yugoslavian example, status at the national level was determined by 
different factors, including the perceived “compatibility” of ethnic groups to the 
Yugoslav ideal. The RAND26 prepared the following table portraying status stratification 
within Yugoslavia in the late 1980s for the United States Army. 
 









++=High status --=Low status 
Table 1.   Status Stratification of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1980s27 
 
 
The ethnic setup of Yugoslavia and the mechanisms, such as JNA9 (Yugoslav 
Federal Army), put in place to prevent ethnic conflict did not make the country safer but 
more susceptible to a violent zero-sum game.28 Each group perceived its relative position 
to the others and could only improve its position by making other groups worse off.29 
This never-ending struggle planted the seeds of instability and rivalry along ethnic lines. 
 Recognition of the languages and religious rights of ethnic minorities is an 
important role in the status equation as well. Although it is not a direct life-and-death 
issue, as with security dilemma, ethnic groups might raise questions and strive for a shift 
                                                 
26 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making 
through research and analysis. 





in status. Can my children learn and practice my religion? What language will be taught 
in the school? Why is my language considered inferior to my neighbor’s?30 These 
legitimate questions might be addressed by the authority or dominant ethnic group but, if 
they are not, they may take society to the brink of conflict. For example, in Burma, 
Buddhism was made the official religion. In Sri Lanka, Sinhala was made the official 
language. Demands for adoption of ethnic symbols such as language and religion were 
interpreted as a push for a status shift and strongly rejected. Concessions to such demands 
precipitated secessionist movements by non-Burmans in Burma and ethnic violence in Sri 
Lanka. 
 For status concerns to be a cause of ethnic conflict, groups must be able to 
compare their relative positions to one another.31 Unfortunately, there is no metric 
available for us to gauge when status grievances trigger a conflict. However, political 
scientist Myron Weiner argues, “Inequalities, real or perceived, are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for ethnic conflict; there must be also competition for control over or 
access to economic wealth, political power or social status.”32 
C. HEGEMONIC AMBITIONS 
According to Byman, another source of ethnic conflict is the hegemonic 
aspirations of dominant ethnic groups. Although an ethnic group’s status and physical 
safety are not at stake, a majority ethnic group may not be satisfied with that and may 
seek absolute dominance. For members of these hegemonic groups, only one religion or 
language—that of the majority—is acceptable.  
Dominant ethnic groups driven by hegemonic ambitions are sometimes intrigued 
with the idea that if they do not win absolute dominance over subordinate groups, they 
will eventually lose. For example, in Malaysia’s Kuala Lumpur in the 1960s, there was a 
big neon sign atop an office building that read, “Jayakan Bahasa Kebangsaan,” which 
translated, means, “Glorify the national language,” which, in turn, was understood to 
                                                 
30 Thomas S. Szayna, “Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model,” RAND 
Corporation, 2000. 
31 Byman, p. 24. 
32 Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee 
Flows” International Security 21, (1): 5-42.Summer, 1996. 
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mean, “Glorify the Malay language,” and, by extension, “Denigrate the other languages,” 
such as Chinese and English.33 Dominant ethnic groups within a government might not 
necessarily be dominant in terms of demographic figures. Malays’ push for linguistic 
domination hardened the identities of subordinate ethnic groups and fueled their 
grievances for more than two decades.  
The hegemonic aspirations of a dominant ethnic group within a society can result 
in serious consequences, varying from complete domination of other ethnic minorities to 
full-fledged ethnic genocide. Even the recognition of political and cultural dominance by 
other ethnic groups cannot guarantee their survival. In Rwanda, for example, the Belgians 
reinforced the Tutsi dominance. After the 1960s, when the Belgians granted 
independence to the Hutu-led government, Hutus blamed the Tutsi minority for every 
major failure of the central government. Finally, during the late spring and early summer 
of 1994, almost one million Rwandans were killed by their fellow citizens.34 Not only 
Tutsis but also moderate Hutus were massacred by militant Hutus, urged on by the 
government and quasi-official radio stations.35 
Hegemonic aspirations are important sources of ethnic conflict. They cause both 
security concerns and status concerns for ethnic minorities and are very conducive to 
ethnic manipulation by ethnic leaders. Thus, there are bidirectional relationships between 
hegemonic aspirations and ethnic leaders. Most of the time ethnic leaders believe that 
there is more to be gained by playing up hegemonic aspirations than by reducing them.  
D. LEADERSHIP AMBITIONS  
What do ethnic leaders seek on the brink of a conflict? Some may argue that 
prevention of conflict would possibly benefit both sides. However, some ethnic leaders 
might seek to personally benefit from people’s grievances by increasing the likelihood of 
conflict rather than solving it. 
                                                 
33 Montville, Joseph “Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies,” 1990, USA: Lexington 
Books. 
34 http://www2.beyondintractability.org/m/addressing_underlying_causes.jsp, Accessed on 01 




Ethnic leaders seek to make ethnicity the dominant political issue in order to 
increase their own power. Under the conditions of an actual or perceived security 
dilemma, status concerns, and hegemonic domination, ethnic leaders can produce 
immediate and profound polarization within the society.  
Even where the set of concerns I have discussed are not present, ethnic leaders, 
along with socio-ethnic pressures, can mobilize society along ethnic lines. In this way, 
they can even cause previously integrated communities to separate along ethnic lines.36 
In framing the issues for the public, ethnic leaders exaggerate the hostility of others and 
magnify the likelihood of conflict. Another common tactic of ethnic leaders is the 
solidification of ethnic lines, eventually making a visible differentiation of who stands for 
whom.37 Then they try to create a “rally round the flag” effect to justify every measure 
and decision undertaken on behalf of the entire ethnic group.38 During his rise to power, 
Adolf Hitler repeatedly blamed the Jewish population for Germany’s defeat in World 
War I and subsequent economic hardships. Then, what began with a simple boycott of 
Jewish shops ended in the gas chambers at Auschwitz as Adolf Hitler and his Nazi 
followers attempted to exterminate the entire Jewish population of Europe. 
Ethnic leaders might not even tolerate moderate voices within their own 
movement in times of imminent conflict. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Elam—one of the most violent movements in the world, which seeks a Tamil state in 
northern Sri Lanka—regularly assassinate the more moderate Tamil leaders who are 
willing to compromise with the majority Sinhalese population there.39  
E. CONCLUSION 
One way to prevent ethnic problems from turning in to full fledged conflict is to 
understand underlying causes of ethnic conflict. However, understanding causes is not 
the end but just the beginning of this study. Creating a lasting peace is difficult under the 
                                                 
36David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” International Security, Vol.21, No. 2, 





best of conditions and impossible when fate and circumstances conspire to keep a conflict 
likely.40 However, although preventing ethnic conflict is a daunting task, it is not 
impossible. 
The four-fold framework developed here addresses causes of potential conflict 
and is aimed to prevent causes from taking root in the first place. Such a framework 
suggests a set of policy tools: “population control” “winning hearts and minds,” 
“strengthening national identity,” and “reengineering the political system.” Each policy 
tool is supported by models and initiatives, which are derived from ongoing and resolved 
ethnic conflicts around the world. Furthermore, in order to solidify my argument, I 
discuss the effects of the implementation or absence of these polices on countries ranging 
from the United States to Malaysia. 
The first tool of the four-fold framework is population control. Providing security 
through effective population control will prevent an ethnic security dilemma from 
occurring.  Hence, population control is discussed in the next chapter.  
                                                 
40Byman, p. 213. 
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III. POPULATION CONTROL 
There is no doubt that there should be some set of principles to control the 
dynamics of multiethnic societies. Philosophers since the time of Thomas Hobbes have 
recognized that the threat of government punishment is the essence of civilized society.41 
However, concerns over the fair use of force or the proportionality of punishment can 
either dampen or fuel the ethnic security dilemma. 
Population control addresses the security needs of ethnic minorities. This reduces 
the need for non-state actors to arm themselves for self-defense against politically 
dominant ethnic groups. Meanwhile, groups or individuals within the dominant ethnic 
groups will not seek violence or intimidation because of the possibility of being arrested 
for their unlawful activities.  
A. CONSENSUS VERSUS COERCION MODEL 
Arguably, even homogenous and developed societies have not reached ultimate 
consensus. Multiethnic societies certainly have not. But the level of grievances and the 
likelihood of violence vary to a considerable degree. In turn, the necessary level of 














Figure 1.   Consensus versus Control Model42 
                                                 
41 Byman, p.37. 
42 Model was taken from Guerilla Warfare lecture notes on 24 August 2006. The class is taught by Dr. 
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Countries [A and B] represented in Figure 1 are assumed to have multiethnic 
societies. According to this model, the less consensus there is in a country, the more 
control it will likely impose upon the population to provide security. This model 
simplifies our understanding in terms of codifying the balance between control and 
consensus. For example, where there is considerable consensus among the different 
ethnic groups, as in Switzerland, minimal police action and monitoring of different 
ethnicities occur. Meanwhile, where there is less consensus among ethnic groups, such as 
in India and Sri Lanka, there is a need for stronger control. A vacuum in consensus must 
be compensated by control. In the long run, control can buy time for policymakers to 
improve conditions for their societies, implement other conciliatory measures, and create 
new intuitions.  
It is difficult to fully grasp ethnic peace in United States without living in and 
witnessing the diversity of its society. What most people see from abroad is a single 
nation with different backgrounds and nationalities. In fact, immigrants from all over the 
world have contributed to the unique character of the United States for over two hundred 
years.  
The United States is a multiethnic society. In 1792, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur 
expressed amazement at American’s diversity, encompassing people drawn from 
virtually every European country as well as Africa.43 The question of how diverse people 
can live cooperatively in multicultural societies is one of the most demanding of our 
times. Arguably, what most Americans take for granted is actually a complex process 
involving policymakers and various law enforcement agencies. 
For example, the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, stimulated 
widespread anxieties over Muslim and Arab minorities in the United States. What 
everybody feared most was not elevated anger and fear would turn into violence towards 
minorities. It has not happened so far. The robust law enforcement capability of 
government to see, monitor, and react to any kind of violent activity prevented 
                                                 
43 http://www.coe.uh.edu/projects/ethnic_america/course_info.html, Accessed on 08 November 2006, 
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communities from arming themselves against each other. Meanwhile, President Bush’s 
visit to a Washington mosque shortly after September 11 had a temporary positive impact 
on Arab-American and Muslim-American communities. The scenario would have been 
totally different in the absence of effective population control. 
In recent years, Americans have witnessed the growing demographics and 
political power of Hispanics. According to census results released in 2004, there are 34 
million Hispanics living in the United States, making it for the first time the largest 
minority in United States. Recently, Los Angles has been the center of a nationwide 
movement to protest a proposed immigration bill, with over one million unhappy 
Hispanics taking to the streets.   
Los Angles has a considerable history of racial and ethnic conflict, ranging from 
the “zoot suit riots” of 1943 through the Watts riots of 1965 to the so-called “Rodney 
King riots” of 1992.44 Politics in Los Angles has often reflected this interethnic conflict, 
from Sam Yorty’s mayoral campaign against the African-American Tom Bradley, which 
many observers felt was laced with quasi-racist appeals, through the high-intensity 
contentiousness over busing for school integration in the 1970s and over illegal 
immigration in the 1990s, to the ethnic rivalries that surfaced in the last mayoral race 
between James Hahn and Antonio Villaraigosa.45 
Yet while African-Americans, and Hispanics struggle for more political room in 
which maneuver, these groups seldom resort to collective violence. The ability of law 
enforcement agencies to distinguish and punish those who actually commit violence has 
convinced many to use civilized means to mobilize for their rights instead. 
Another Western liberal democracy that simultaneously enjoys the benefits of a 
multicultural society is Canada. In Canada, ethnic tensions rose in 1970s as more and 
more French Canadians in Québec started articulating their desire to be recognized as one 
of the founding nations of Canada.46 The English in Québec held economic power, were 
                                                 
44 “Assessment of Interethnic Conflict in Los Angeles,” UCLA Center for Study and Resolution of 
Interethnic Conflict, March 12, 2002. 
45Ibid. 
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mostly Protestant, and spoke only English. The French were excluded from economic 
power, were Catholic, and spoke French although most had to have a working knowledge 
of English as well.47 This led to a further increase in the intensity of the conflict, which 
became violent with activities of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), Some Québec 
nationalists considered the situation intolerable and demanded the separation of Québec 
from Canada.48 
After the motion to pursue Québec’s independence was defeated by an extremely 
small margin, 50.58 percent to 49.42 percent, on October 30, 1995, there were concerns 
at all levels of law enforcement that there would be civil disobedience, occupation of 
public buildings, and violent communal confrontation along ethnic lines. However, 
highly professional Canadian and Québec security forces appreciated the need to 
maintain order and social stability and prevent the fears that could mobilize the masses 
along ethnic faults. In 1991, General John de Chastelain, Commander of the Canadian 
Armed Forces, stated that “...in any constitutional debate, and in any action that results, 
the role of the Armed Forces will be a silent one, and that our only involvement will be to 
assist the police and associated agencies in the maintenance of law and order, should that 
be necessary.”49 Furthermore, the police forces of Canada are capable of effective, 
coordinated, and restrained action, as indicated in the large-scale raid on terrorists carried 
out in May 1997 by the Québec police.50  
Far away from the Western hemisphere, another country has placed its fate and 
survival on the merits of population control. Given the fact that Arabs and Jews have 
fought four wars since the foundation of the Israeli state in 1948, the question of how 
Arabs and Jews have lived in relative peace for decades within Israel itself requires 
further attention. 
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At the time of Israel’s establishment, the Israeli Arabs numbered about 110,000—
about 11 percent of the total Israeli population—and lived under the administration of a 
military government. There were times when this percentage rose and fell depending 
upon the rate of Jewish immigration to Israel. Although they have lived for decades under 
Israeli rule, Arabs have never been fully integrated into society nor have Israelis fully 
accepted them as citizens. As Sammy Smooha and John Hoffman note, “The two groups 
exhibit pervasive cultural differences. They differ in all basic values, such as ethnic 
origin, language, nationality, and family structure.”51 Despite these differences, conflict 
between Jews and Arabs within Israel itself stopped after the1947–49 wars. Israeli Arabs 
were not a fifth column during the subsequent Arab-Israeli wars nor did they support 
Palestinian terrorists.52 
Since the foundation of the state of Israel, the government has arguably eased the 
tensions between Jews and Arabs within the country. But, without any doubt, in a highly 
contagious environment like the Middle East, policymakers somehow convinced both 
ethnic groups not to take up arms. While Jews felt safer with military might and a 
overwhelming police presence in their community, Arabs were not intimidated. When a 
radical communal leader emerged with a radical agenda, he faced criminal charges and 
was isolated from rest of the Arab population, who were generally in favor of peace. This 
equilibrium remained steady even after an Israeli Arab blew himself up and caused the 
deaths of many innocents Jews. Effective population control policies also dissuaded 
radical Jewish groups from forming unauthorized armed groups to seek revenge. 
Grievances have never turned to targeting the masses along communal lines. 
B. STRUCTURE OF SECURITY FORCES 
The formation and composition of security forces are as important as the policy 
behind the implementation of force. Whether a police force inspires confidence or fear, 
pride or resentment, depends in part on whether one ethnic group dominates the force and 
whether it is used to arbitrate among groups or to enforce discriminatory or hegemonic 
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state policies.53 The best formation is one composed proportionally of all ethnic groups 
within the state. Furthermore, recruiting local people from varying ethnic communities 
not only facilitates law enforcement efforts but also increases community cooperation.  
For example, the Los Angles Police Department has been devoting considerable effort to 
recruiting and deploying individuals from all ethnicities to ensure that they are all 
represented and respected. 
However, certain ethnic groups may not be willing to contribute to the security 
structure. This is a concern that requires further attention. People may not want to join an 
organization that is, in their view, unjust or not fair. More dangerously, individuals who 
are willing to serve in the security force may face hostility from their own community. 
This is what we have seen happening in Iraq. After the fall of the Saddam regime, the 
Sunni minority has been lagging when it has come not only joining the security forces but 
also the political system. Moreover, the few who have volunteered have been targeted by 
the rest of the Sunni insurgency. At the same time, without Sunni participation, security 
forces have generated more resentment against the central government in Sunni-
dominated neighborhoods. 
C. CONCLUSION 
No function of government is more sensitive than physical law enforcement. A 
regulation or law perceived as unjust may alienate an ethnic group, but a bullet that kills a 
mother, a child, or an ethnic leader will enrage it, even if fired by mistake. Even the 
restrained arrest and physical removal of defiant lawbreakers from their homes or 
businesses will infuriate people. If the soldiers or police officers are from the other ethnic 
group, the anger will be directed at all the other members of that group, not just their 
political and security forces. Once violence reaches a certain point, efforts to contain it 
actually contribute to escalation. In 2000, the Israeli shooting of Arab demonstrators 
supporting the “Al Aqsa” intifada enraged the Israeli Arab community, highlighting their 
second-class status.54 
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Nothing can turn good citizens against government more quickly than military or 
police forces that treat populations differently along ethnic lines. Therefore, all ethnic 
groups should be proportionally represented in the security structure. 
Finally, the primary objective of effective population control is to prevent the 
ethnic security dilemma from mobilizing dormant masses. Thus, control itself is not an 
end but the just the beginning of the four-fold model. Once security is no longer a main 
concern of the population, governmental policies should be tailored to embrace all ethnic 
groups and reconcile their grievances. One way to build more consensus is to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the people. This effort requires both psychological and structural 
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IV. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 
“That nauseating term I think I invented” 
— Sir Gerald Templar, when referring to the term “hearts and minds” 
fifteen years after Malayan Emergency.55 
 Ethnic peace cannot be maintained solely by population control policies. There 
are many examples of long-lasting empires that achieved relative stability by might rather 
than through the consent of the governed. Yet efforts to achieve stability thorough 
coercion and control cannot be considered legitimate and long lasting. Therefore, 
governments should use a range of initiatives to win the support of the ethnic groups. 
 I made a case in Chapter II that ethnic conflict is about people, their grievances, 
and the struggle for power. These concerns must be addressed at the grassroots level. 
Although co-opting ethnic minorities certainly brings reasonable stability and peace, how 
long can people be co-opted? A year? A decade? 
 Because of this, winning people’s hearts and minds is a primary objective of 
building consensus over time. To win the hearts and minds of minorities in multiethnic 
societies, I propose two sets of initiatives that are derived from the broad research of the 
literature. These are psychological initiatives and structural initiatives. 
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVES 
How people think and feel about their ethnicity and about their relative position in 
society compared to other ethnic groups is a part of the solution in maintaining ethnic 
peace. Manipulating psychological expectations and providing understanding would be 
helpful in easing tensions. The psychological needs, such as security, status concern, and 
recognition can be satisfied through assurance. Of course, good intentions alone will not 
necessarily be enough to establish sustainable peace and prevent ethnic conflict.  
The psychological initiatives I propose here include recognition, equal justice, and 
leadership. These are the three pillars of winning the hearts and minds of ethnic  
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minorities. Also, they support the structural initiatives, which are then built upon the 
success of the psychological initiatives. Figure 2 demonstrates the foundation of this 
model. 
 




The idea of diverse and multiethnic societies has often been regarded as 
untenable, detrimental to national unity, and a source of conflict within the state. This 
false perception sometimes leads policymakers to ignore the fact that different ethnic 
groups are coexisting within the society. In some extreme cases, this false perception has 
led to policies of forced assimilation, suppression of ethnic identities, and even, in some 
instances, ethnic cleansing and genocide. 
In reality, there is no real tradeoff between recognizing diversity and maintaining 
peace and stability. Policymakers should recognize that multiple identities can coexist 
and reinforce each other. For example, an individual living in a country but speaking 
another language and practicing another religion can still contribute to the well being of 
his\her country. Therefore, I strongly argue that recognition of ethnic differences by 
government is the first and foremost initiative towards ethnic peace.  
During the Franco era in Spain, policies toward cultural, ethnic, and linguistic 




unification, integration, and homogenization of the country.56 This fueled grievances 
among the Catalans, Basques, and Galicians.57 With the restoration of democracy in 
1978, Spain amended its constitution to recognize and guarantee the autonomy of the 
nationalities and regions that comprise it and the solidarity among them. This initiative 
actually started the process of reconciliation of differences between the government of 
Spain and the ethnic groups and finally succeeded in bringing ethnic peace to the country. 
As in Spain, India has a highly complex and colorful social mosaic. Yet, although 
characterized by vast cultural diversity and heterogeneity, this mosaic is not chaotic.58 It 
has a clearly discernible pattern, wherein socio-cultural diversity draws its strength and 
sustenance from India’s composite culture and civilizational thrust.59 On the flip side of 
the coin, it was not an easy process to reach consensus among eight major ethnicities 
comprising over one billion people.  
No “ethnic” conflict in India has been more traumatic than the one involving the 
Punjab, the “homeland” of the Sikhs, who make up some 55 to 60 percent of the local 
population.60 At least twenty thousand people have died in political violence there since 
1981. Distrust between the Hindu government and the Sikhs peaked in June 1984, when 
the army besieged Amritsar’s Golden Temple, the major Sikh shrine, alienating most 
Sikhs from the government. Later, India realized that detrimental and coercive 
governmental policies were doing nothing but fueling the conflict and granted more 
rights and recognized its ethnic minorities.61 Constitutional changes provided recognition 
and protection and brought guarantees for all ethnic groups. 
It is remarkable that where these minority identities have been given due 
recognition, as in the cases of Belgium, Spain, or India, citizens claimed as much 
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affiliation to their national identities as to their ethnic ones. Recognizing and respecting 
diversity strengthens, rather than weakens the state.62  
2. Equal Justice 
 What would be the best way to create ethnic harmony in multiethnic societies? A 
simple but striking idea was stated clearly in Martin Luther King’s famous speech 
delivered in August 1963 in Washington, DC: 
“I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation 
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content 
of their character.” 
 Justice is a complex concept with substantive and symbolic economic, social, 
legal, and psychological meanings.63 It may be retributive, distributive, restorative, or 
legal justice.64 In this study, I refer to legal justice as a tool for providing equal treatment 
for everyone before the law. Legal justice entails making and implementing decisions 
according to fair processes. People will feel affirmed if the procedures that are adopted 
treat them with respect and dignity, making it easier to accept even outcomes they do not 
like.65 
 Where the government is dominated by the representatives of one ethnic group, 
other ethnic groups will tend to suspect or speculate about the fairness of the legal 
procedures. But what makes legal justice fair? First of all, decisions should be neutral and 
impartial regardless of ethnicity. This is a must-have condition for any fair legal system 
to function. Sometimes even the Western-type full-fledged democracies are accused of 
not implementing impartial legal procedures. 
On Sunday, January 30, 1972, thirteen civil rights protestors were shot to death by 
members of 2nd Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment in Derry, Northern Ireland. 
According to many eyewitness accounts, including bystanders and journalists, all of the 
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protestors were unarmed.66 Immediately after the incident, known as Bloody Sunday ever 
since, the British government held an inquiry to investigate the happenings. Later, the 
Widgery Tribunal, appointed by the British government, found the soldiers not guilty and 
cleared the British authorities. Although the Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign 
started before Bloody Sunday, obviously the incident itself and the legal fiasco in its 
aftermath deepened the grievances among Protestants and Catholics and boosted the 
status of the IRA as well as its recruitment.67 
 Lastly, the legal justice process should be transparent and ethnic groups should be 
represented in the legal decision-making process. The psychosocial theorists also believe 
that legal justice is the primary factor associated with the public’s perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the justice system.68 Legal theorists likewise agree that legal justice is a 
necessary component of any legal system and is the cornerstone for the legitimacy of 
governmental systems.69 
3. Leadership Behavior 
Both national and local government leaders are highly visible in their societies. 
Their attitudes towards different ethnicities can make a great contribution to maintaining 
peace and winning hearts and minds. I explore leadership behavior in two dimensions: 
top-level leadership and grassroots leadership.70 Both of them are equally important but 
they differ in the size of their target audience. Figure 3 demonstrates top-level and 
grassroots leaders and their respective behaviors. 
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Leadership Behavior  • Do not offend  • Participate and embrace festivalss  • Promote shared values  • Keep in touch with ethnic leaders  
  





Figure 3.   Top-Level and Grassroots Leadership71 
 
a. Top-Level Leadership 
Top-level leadership includes national government, political party leaders, 
and high-ranking military leaders. They are the highest representatives of government 
and, due to lots of press coverage and air time, their attitudes toward ethnic problems 
resonate among the millions in a single day.72 On the other hand, while top leaders 
benefit from high visibility, their statements also carry enormous weight. 
However, in multiethnic nations, government leaders are under constant 
pressure to maintain relatively dominant positions and constituencies. In the meantime, 
they are responsible for the ultimate security and well being of the entire population. 
Given those facts, what should they do to win the hearts and minds of millions?  
First of all, many leaders perceive that an emotional public speech or an 
effective public relations campaign would bring thousands aboard. Although a few 
people might come aboard, they tend to get off at the next stop if the speech or campaign 
is not supported by reliable policies. Generally, newly elected leaders bring new hopes. 
They start the game with one hundred points and they begin to lose points along the way. 
Thus, they must not offend the religious, linguistic, or cultural values of ethnic groups. 
Secondly, they should participate in and embrace important days\festivals on behalf of 
entire nation.  
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National leaders are there for promoting shared values rather than 
differences. They need to reassure all ethnic groups and build more trust, hopefully 
increasing mutual consensus across the country. Besides those things, they should contact 
the leaders of minority ethnic groups and prevent them from drifting towards more 
radical courses of action that are likely to bring nothing but pain. 
b. Grassroots Leadership 
Leadership at this level is based on face-to-face communication and day-
to-day efforts to gain and maintain support for an overarching policy. But who are 
grassroots leaders? In fact, they are community leaders, local security officials, and local 
government officials. In other words, they are the ones who operate at the ground zero of 
ethnic groups. 
In many instances, local-level misconduct by a local-level official may 
turn out to create a major confrontation along ethnic lines. Thus, local officials need to 
address the concerns and expectations of individuals. This can be achieved by the 
immediate availability of governmental services, such as schools, health services, roads, 
and security forces. People in a remote village should be reached for and grasped by the 
warm hands of government protection. Grassroots leaders are the ones who will provide 
and fairly distribute already scarce resources among those people. 
Furthermore, grassroots leaders should be accustomed to the way of life in 
their area and appreciate local’s distinct culture. In some countries, when local officials 
are sent to rural areas, where ethnic fault lines are more visible than in the cosmopolitan 
cities, they tend to live in Middle Ages-style castles built like small cities and do not 
interact with the local population.  
Finally, as it is in business and industry, proactive leadership makes a 
significant difference in the management of ethnic conflict. In this kind of long-lasting 
struggle, both top-level and grassroots leaders have unique roles to play. More 
importantly, to what extent they become successful will define the level of cooperation 




B. STRUCTURAL INITIATIVES 
 Structural initiatives are designed to address disequilibrium between ethnic 
groups’ expectations and state policies. Policies for correcting disequilibrium can be 
interpreted as a form of affirmative action. In that regard, I discuss three major structural 
initiatives. These are economic, educational, and cultural initiatives. I selected these three 
initiatives because, without bridging the disequilibrium between an ethnic group’s 
economic, cultural, language expectations and reality, no governmental policy will 
maintain support in the long term. 
1. Economic Initiative  
Ethnic groups, particularly when concentrated in one part of the country, may 
tend to believe that the government is punishing them by deliberately depriving them of 
resources and investments that the rest of the population enjoys. However, investors tend 
to avoid risky environments in which company lives and property are threatened.73 The 
unwillingness of private companies to invest capital in such regions cannot be a 
legitimate reason for a government to blame either ethnic minorities or entrepreneurs. 
According to Francis Stewart, there are three types of policy that may be adopted 
to achieve greater group equality in economic entitlements.74 Firstly, governments can 
change policies towards processes that are biased toward a particular ethnic group. 
Secondly, the state can provide direct assistance to particular groups, such as subsidizing 
housing and providing job training. Lastly, governments can introduce targets and quotas 
for educational, financial, and physical assets.  
These policies have been used as a package or individually by many different 
governments all around the world. Two of the most successful examples, Malaysia and 
Northern Ireland, illustrate how these policies can contribute to reducing economic 
inequalities and supporting peace. Until 1969, Malaysia experienced large annual growth 
rates of about six percent per annum, but this benefited the urban-based Chinese and 
other non-Malay communities more than the native Malays, who made up about 47 
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percent of the population.75 Following riots in 1969, a symptom of growing ethnic 
tension, the governing Alliance party introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP), which 
attempted to distribute the benefits of growth more widely. This involved setting job 
quotas to encourage the recruitment of more Malay workers at all levels of industry and 
finance. As a result of NEP, income imbalances declined and more Malays were 
employed in non-agricultural work. Perhaps as a result of these policies, direct ethnic 
violence has not been common in Malaysia.76  
As in Malaysia, sharp economic disequilibrium among Catholics and Protestants 
in Northern Ireland was an important factor behind the outbreak of violence in the 
1970s.77 The British government implemented two fair employment acts, first in 1976 
and again in 1989, which greatly reduced employment discrimination.78 Inequalities in 
income and housing also declined within a decade. The success of these policies was 
believed to be a factor in explaining why the Catholic community was prepared to stop 
violent action.79 
2. Educational Initiative 
An education initiative is a key criterion in preventing conflict in multiethnic 
societies. It will bring hope, opportunity, a sense of belonging, and recognition for all 
ethnic groups. Also, educating ethnic masses may prevent them from being manipulated 
or provoked by radicals  
An education initiative, in a relatively short time, can bring together many people 
with different ethnic backgrounds and change the composition of student bodies. The 
Malaysian government began to pay close attention to the ethnic composition of the 
university student bodies and its constitution was eventually amended to permit the 
government to control the university admission rates of Malays. 
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Like Malaysia, the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka was at its peak in the 1970s. A 
new wave of violence claimed the lives of many policemen and soldiers.80 A new 
admissions system, which introduced certain benefits to favor of Tamils confused 
hardcore Tamils who expected no equal treatment with the Sinhalese majority.81 The 
government went one step further and opened a new campus in Jaffna, in the Tamil 
heartland.82 Overall, education initiatives played a role in lessening the grievances and 
dampening the conflict in Sri Lanka. 
Soon after the collapse of apartheid, the new government in South Africa set 
about restructuring the educational system that had previously been segregated by race, 
class, and language. The de-racialization and integration of schools in South Africa has 
been straightforward and the design of the educating system has provided a medium for 
integrating ethnic, class, and language divisions. In accordance with the new 
governmental policies, schools have adopted policies for widening access to learners of 
other cultural and linguistic groups. This integration and participation maximizes mutual 
consensus. 
3. Cultural Initiative 
What rights and symbolic dignity are accorded by the state to a group’s language 
or to its religious beliefs and practices? The answer to this question rests at the heart of an 
effective cultural initiative. Cultural policies are an important aspect of group grievances 
and, consequently, of governmental policies. Such policies should aim to correct cultural 
exclusion and discrimination.83   
Language is a critical issue in many multiethnic states. Any structural policy that 
does not address language issues will not be sufficiently inclusive. Belgium is a great 
example of reaching consensus via a language initiative. Belgium was deeply divided 
between Flemish-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia in the 1950s and 
1960s. In 1971, the constitution was amended with a new article that stipulated that both 
French and Flemish were official languages of Belgium and the government was required 
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to ensure education in both languages. Along with equal political participation and 
recognition, the language initiative considerably eased tensions and led the way for 
Belgium to become the headquarters of multicultural organizations such as NATO and 
the European Union. 
 Along with language and religion, ceremonies and symbols occupy an important 
space in the formation of ethnic culture. Among the many examples are the sites of 
religious buildings in India and Israel as well as the Orange parades in Northern Ireland, 
which mark Protestant Prince William of Orange’s victory over the Catholic King James 
II at the Battle of Boyne.84  
 The impact of cultural initiatives on winning hearts and minds is undeniable. 
Dimitrijevics argues that cultural initiatives and policies aimed at cultural aspects have 
been more important than either political or economic policies.85 Hence, policymakers 
should not leave the cultural domain of ethnic groups in the hands of radicals and ethno-
nationalists. They need to regulate cultural disequilibrium and build consensus over time.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have proposed a “hearts-and-minds” campaign model for 
maintaining ethnic peace in multiethnic nations. The necessity of such a campaign 
derives from the disequilibrium between the psychological and structural expectations of 
ethnic groups and government policies. Thus, governmental policies need to correct 
psychological expectations, such as recognition, equal justice, and the behavior of the 
leadership, as well as eliminate structural inequalities, such as economic, educational, and 
cultural imbalances. Although such initiatives are likely to produce resistance from 
dominant ethnic groups who are losing some privileges, they have been proven to provide 
moderation and peace in countries like Northern Ireland, Malaysia, and Belgium. 
Additional language and education policies are discussed in more detail as tools of 
identity-hardening in Chapter V. 
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Another tool of the four-fold framework is strengthening national identity. In 
today’s world, multiethnic states are increasingly the norm. Hence, governments around 
the world, varying from the democratic to the totalitarian, are engaging in identity-
hardening campaigns by direct or indirect means. Although identity-building tools like 
education, religion, language, and promulgation of national symbols can be divisive in 
multiethnic societies, through the implementation of correct governmental policies, they 
can also be indispensable tools for building a cohesive national identity. 
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V. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL IDENTITY 
“Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno”86 
 
Despite the reality of national diversity, belief in the importance of the nation-state 
still persists.87 This need not entail a denial of the fact of national diversity but instead 
can involve the assertion that the state can only be stable if it is held together—unified by 
people’s sense of belonging to a single, strong, national identity.88 Although many 
attempts at establishing strong national unity have resulted in bloodshed or rebellion, 
over the course of history a large number of nation-states have achieved national unity in 
a positive sense.  
In 1698, when the Peace of Westphalia inaugurated the era of the nation-state, many 
of the states that exist today were collections of dialect groups that had little in common 
with their neighbors.89 For example, France had to transform a region of French, Celtic, 
German, Flemish, Basque, Spanish, and Italian groups into the ethnically homogenous 
France of today.90 When Italy was unified in 1870, only a small portion of the population 
spoke Italian. As Massimo d’Azeglio famously observed, “We have made Italy; now we 
must make Italians.”91 
Again, how some multiethnic nations have reached a national consensus to live 
peacefully side-by-side and maintain considerable unity is worthy of further exploration. 
Many governments around the world have engaged in nation building in an attempt to 
join formerly disparate and rival people into one nation.92 Such efforts often involve a 
combination of legal changes that contrive to blur or obliterate ethnic status through 
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regulations forbidding certain types of dress, schooling in a common language with a 
common curriculum, and the promulgation of national symbols (flag, anthem, and 
heroes) that unify residents.93 
In this thesis, educational and linguistic policies, the promulgation of national 
symbols, and religion are discussed as tools that might be pursued by governments 
seeking national unity. The goals of these policies are not to destroy sub-identities but to 
strengthen an overarching national identity. Hence, the goal of national unity should not 
be to impose common identities on deeply divided peoples but to organize a social and 
political life that can allow people to live together despite their differences. 
A. EDUCATION POLICIES 
With respect to national identity and ethnic groups, an educational policy plays an 
important role in the integration of plural societies. Educational institutions are the very 
first places where young generations ask questions and search for answers. Questions like 
“Who am I?” or “What do national symbols such as songs, flags, and heroes tell me and 
others about my identity?” are answered.  
Many counties have used some form of a national education policy. Even though 
the intentions may vary with different countries, any national education policy indicates 
an intent to homogenize the constituent members comprising a multiethnic nation. 
Education plays a fundamental role in building a sense of belonging and self-awareness 
within different ethnic identities. 
Countries like Turkey and Malaysia applied common national educational 
policies toward integrating their plural societies. The end of World War I marked the end 
of a six-century reign for the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. It also triggered a war of 
independence for people living in Anatolia that resulted in the Turkish Revolution. 
Following the revolution, Turkey inherited a three-headed educational system. The 
survival of the young republic could not be sustained by maintaining that heritage.  
The educational institutions were far from being national before the revolution. 
The schools were structured in three main channels as horizontal institutions, closed to 
each other. The first and most common one was local schools and medreses, based on 
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memorizing the Qur’an in Arabic. The second was the reformist schools of Tanzimat, 
called idadî and Sultanî.94 The third were the schools educating in foreign languages, like 
colleges and minority schools. In these three channels, three different opinions, three 
different life styles, and even three different peoples of different eras were being 
educated. 
Within this atmosphere, it was possible to raise generations that accepted national 
sovereignty as a lifestyle, were willing to strengthen national culture, and could attain 
national unity connected via these three educational channels. Within the transformation 
process, radical measures were taken and the Law on Unification of National Education 
No. 430 was put into force on March 3, 1924. Through this law, the three channels were 
merged.95 The medreses were closed, the reformist schools of Tanzimat were developed, 
and those educating in foreign languages were put under the control and custody of the 
Ministry of National Education. 
During the transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, education 
policies were vital in creating a national consensus and the Turkish national identity. The 
reunification of education in the 1920s was a major pillar in the creation of a secular 
modern state. 
As a former British colony with substantial ethnic Indian and Chinese minorities, 
Malaysia searched for a national identity after achieving independence from Britain in 
1957. Malaysia, like Turkey, has tried to establish a national identity mainly through 
language and education. According to Tun Abdul Razak, the second Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, who headed the country from 1970 to 1976, the main objective of the 
education policies was not outright cultural assimilation but, rather, a process of 
integration by mutual adjustment of diverse cultural and social traits, acceptable to all 
races in the country.96 
Before the bloody riots of 1969, there was no national education policy in 
Malaysia. There was widespread suspicion about the agenda of Chinese schools in the 
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country. When education first became a genuine national issue, a principal concern was 
to ensure Malaysian internal security.97 The nationalization of education and the 
unification of the existing polyglot schools were considered mandatory if the young 
regime was to guarantee the nation’s integrity against the threats of subversion. Although 
subsequent governments in Kuala Lumpur had fears about subversive activities under 
Chinese schools, they continuously adopted new initiatives toward strengthening genuine 
Malaysian national unity and its requisites.98 
 In the 1980s, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was initiated. Education was given a 
central role in the development strategy formulated by the NEP because it was believed 
that educational development affects the nation in many vital aspects. Malaysian 
policymakers regarded it as a vehicle for modernizing society and attaining social goals, 
equal opportunities, and national unity.99 
 A number of educational policies, created to build a genuine Malaysian identity, 
promote national values, and teach the national language, are still operating. Furthermore, 
it seems like almost a half-century’s effort to build national unity has paid off. Although 
there are debates over economic disequilibrium among different ethnic groups, there is 
significant consensus regarding common Malaysian values and identity. 
B. LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The worldwide problem of language and identity comes from the fact that, 
whereas there are more than 200 sovereign states, there are more than 2000 forms of 
written language.100 This astonishing reality makes it clear that language policies 
implemented by governments in multiethnic societies can be either a barrier to or the glue 
for social integration. 
Language is important both as a communication medium and as the basis of 
national thinking in the formation of a national consciousness. Throughout history, 
languages have been an indispensable tool for nation building. Working toward the 
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unification of Germany in the late eighteenth century, social thinkers such as T. G Herder 
emphasized a primordial phenomenon of nationhood.  
During the second half of the last century, a significant number of governments 
had to create comprehensive language policies for their nations. Canada, the United 
States, Belgium, Finland, Spain, and France are some of the countries on a long list. 
Whereas some of the countries mentioned above had similar approaches, like Sweden, 
Belgium, and Canada, France had different incentives. Here, I briefly describe what 
policies they put in place to maintain national unity within the boundaries of ethnic 
peace. 
One way to promote national unity is to grant constitutional rights to the different 
ethnic identities. The bilingual policy of the Canadian government reassured the 
territorially based francophone population in Québec. While Canadian elites favor a 
bilingual Canada, elites in Québec insist on a unilingual Québec. As in Canada, language 
has always been a source of conflict in Belgium. The situation there is characterized not 
only by a complexity of regional dialects, but especially by the official institution of three 
different languages: Dutch, French, and German. All three have been recognized as 
official languages of the country.  
Another way to promote national unity is to recognize the languages of ethnic 
minorities while still promoting, an overarching national language. Spain is one of the 
most linguistically varied states in Western Europe. There are three major ethnic 
identities and languages. They are Castilian in Catalan, Basque in the Basque region, and 
Gallego in Galicia. However, Spanish is the only national language that is favored by the 
government. Among the three regional languages, the prospects for Gallego are not bright 
due to a low level of ethnic consciousness and a lack of commitment to it.101  
However, the United States, with considerable ethnic minorities, has a different 
recipe. In the United States, a Vietnamese can take a written driving test in his\her 
language, a Mexican can work and sustain a family without speaking English, and a 
Chinese can publish and read a newspaper in his language. English cannot be described 
as an official language and it has no official federal status in the United States. 
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Different language policies have been implemented by different nations. It is hard 
to tell which ones are best. The intent here is not to rank the countries in terms of 
language policies but to demonstrate that language is an issue in the formation of national 
identity. 
C. PROMULGATION OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS 
National symbols provide perhaps the strongest and clearest statement of national 
identity. In essence, they serve as modern totems that bear a special relationship to the 
nation they represent, distinguishing them from others and reaffirming identity 
boundaries.102 Since the inception of nations, national leaders have embraced and 
adopted   national symbols to create bonds, motivate patriotic action, honor the efforts of 
citizens, and legitimize formal authority.103  
 Immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
all Americans, regardless of ethnicity or religion, rallied around the flag, one of the 
strongest national symbols. Two pictures taken during the rescue operations resonated all 
around the world. Those photographs portray firefighters, soldiers, and civilians raising 
the national flag as a statement of resilience and loyalty to their country. This was similar 
what occurred two generations ago, when the US was at war and Associated Press 
photographer Joe Rosenthal snapped a picture of five Marines and a Navy Corpsman 
raising “Old Glory” on Mount Suribachi on the Pacific island of Iwo Jima in February 
1945.104 The photo became a WW II icon and the basis for the Marine Corps memorial 
sculpture overlooking Washington, D.C. The Battle of Iwo Jima also is recognized as the 
beginning of the end of the campaign against the Japanese in the Pacific. 
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Figure 4.   Firefighters Raising the American Flag at the Pentagon and in the 
Rubble of the World Trade Center 
 
The proliferation of the American flag right after the 9/11 attacks was a stark 
visual example of how we instinctively look to the symbols of national identity in 
reaction to a national attack.105 Furthermore, a greater surprise was how much the Twin 
Towers were apparently counted as a national symbol even for Americans living 
thousands of miles away from New York, who had never visited the city, and who 
normally think of it as embodying values quite opposite to their own.106 
 Many multiethnic nations do not have as many national symbols of unity as the 
United States. For example, in Malaysia, there have been few national symbols that 
would appeal to all groups of the population.107 The main governmental symbols were 
predominantly Malay. Consequently, the concept of national identity tended to be 
emotionally empty to the Chinese and other non-Malayan ethnicities.108 Apart from 
governmental symbols, hardly any other symbols could be found, which would evoke 
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favorable responses from all ethnic groups.109 . For example, due to Malaysia’s lack of 
national symbols, the king, as the symbol of the state as well as of Malay political 
hegemony, could ostracize other ethnic groups. Consequently, Malaysia produced a 
group of national symbols to which the entire nation contributes and can be proud of. 
Malaysia’s economic products and infrastructure provide national logos for the country: 
Proton, the national car; Petronas Towers, the world’s tallest buildings; and Malaysia 
Airlines have all come to symbolize the modern Malaysia.110 The government’s slogan, 
“Malaysia Boleh!” (Malaysia Can!), is meant to encourage even greater accomplishments 
for future generations.111 
 The promulgation of national symbols, such as a national anthem, a national flag, 
liberators, and great personalities, has been adopted by many governments to convey a 
national identity. However, ethnically divided nations inherently have a hard time 
producing symbols that embrace all ethnic groups. In such circumstances, producing new 
national symbols rather than enforcing those that represent the dominant ethnic group 
would be more useful for forming or creating a national identity.  
D. RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Strengthening national identity through religion is another notable way to achieve 
cohesion in multiethnic states. Because religion promotes brotherhood among believers 
and encourages them to seek unified communities, not only ethnic groups but also 
various nationalities throughout history have rallied around religious symbols and have 
fought holy wars and jihads. 
There are mainly two schools of thought to explain the interaction between 
national identity and religion.112 They are modernization theory and social cohesion 
theory. The one more closely related to my argument is modernization theory. According 
to this theory, the role of religion is one of the distinguishing marks between traditional 
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and modern societies.113 In traditional societies, where religion is a major cohesive force, 
a value system is unquestioningly accepted by all members due to its sacredness.114 
Since, religion does not play an important role in modern societies where cohesion is 
based on secular values, such as democracy, equality, and freedom. This argument may 
not hold for every single case. However, there are many modern countries where religion 
and national identity are so intermingled that they cannot be differentiated.  
Israel represents a great example of this. Israel is unique in that it is the only 
country in which Judaism is the religion of a majority of its citizens. In this manner, 
national identity is built around religious identity. For Jews, religion includes not only an 
exclusive belief but also a unique tradition, a distinct language, and a remarkable history. 
Any attempt to define Israeli national identity on a secular basis has been questioned by 
the Jewish majority. Further reflecting the strong bond between religious and national 
identity in Israel, since Judaism is a religion, is that one can only become a Jew by 
religious conversion, which, in turn facilitates obtaining Israel citizenship.115 On the 
other hand, Jews in Israel who convert to other religions do not thereby lose Israeli 
citizenship, although their national identity certainly might be questioned.116 Hence, 
although it is a modern secular state in the heart of the Middle East, even Israel has not 
been able reconcile the inherent contradiction between secular values and Jewish heritage 
in defining its national identity. 
Other than Israel, a number of states in the Middle East have placed religion in the 
center when creating a national identity. In fact, with the exception of Turkey, all of the 
countries of the Middle East have opted for a religion-centric identity.117 In some cases, 
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this coincided with state formation; in others, religion gradually replaced other symbols 
as the pre-eminent national identity.118 
In Saudi Arabia, for example, religion has deliberately been used by the regime to 
build a national Saudi identity, which supposedly consolidates the legitimacy of the 
ruling family. Saudi Arabia is ruled by a theocracy. Citizenship is not open to non-
Muslims. The idea of religious pluralism has neither meaning nor support among many 
segments of the population and Muslim norms and practices are encouraged, promoted, 
and even enforced by the state.119 Islam’s holy book, the Qur’an, is the constitution, and 
Islamic law, Shari’ah, is the foundation of the legal system. Even national symbols, such 
as the flag and anthem, are designed to promote Islamic values. 
 
 
Figure 5.   National Flag and Coat of Arms of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
 
The Saudi flag is the traditional Wahhabi banner in color. Its Arabic inscription, 
which reads, “There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Messenger of God,” and sword 
are all salient religious motifs.120 The state coat of arms consists of crossed swords and a 
date palm tree. The former symbolizes the bond between the house of Sa’ud and Islam; 
the latter indicates the territorial dimension of the kingdom and its nature.121   
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Israel and Saudi Arabia are just two prominent examples of how religion has been 
influential in the construction of national identities. Other examples, such as the role of 
Catholicism in defining the Irish identity or the role of the Shi’a faction of Islam in 
differentiating the Iranian identity are obvious.122 Even in an apparently secular country 
such as England, God has not really ceased to be an Englishman.123 Finally, providing a 
national identity may not be a universal function of religion in contemporary societies, 
but it is still a fairly common one.124 
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite the reality of national diversity, many nations, including multiethnic ones, 
have continuously strived to maintain their national unity by promoting a common 
national identity. Language, education, national symbols, and religion have been used 
extensively for this purpose.  
Last but not least, in order to have peaceful and successful ethnic accommodation, 
political systems should be redesigned to ensure that all ethnic groups have a voice in 
governmental and legislative procedures. In the following chapter, a power-sharing 
model of consociational democracy is discussed. 
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VI. REENGINEERING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Elections themselves do not necessarily guarantee democracy and fair 
representation of ethnic minorities. Every democratic system differs in design.  In some 
electoral designs, minorities are not provided opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process. These are called hegemonic democracies.125 Hegemonic democracies 
are designed to remove minorities from political systems or to grant unfair advantages to 
ethnic majorities.  
Other strategies that fall into the hegemonic approach include subjugation, 
isolation, avoidance, and displacement of ethnic groups.126 As I argued in previous 
chapters, the struggle for political power is one of the direct or indirect sources of ethnic 
conflicts. One important way to resolve ethnic tensions is to reengineer a participatory 
electoral system. As a result, ethnic groups with a voice in the government are often able 
to resolve their differences through the political process rather than resort to war.127 
The central question of political engineering is: what kind of political system can 
facilitate ethnic peace in situations where one ethnic identity is dominating the political 
space? The answer to that question is not a simple but a definitive one. The common 
assumption is that choices over the basic rules of the game affect its outcome.128 David 
Horowitz (1985) writes, “Where there is some determination to play by the rules, rules 
can reconstruct the system so the game itself changes.”  
Ethnic identities tend to be invested with a great deal of symbolic and emotional 
meaning. Aspiring politicians in such “divided societies” often have strong incentives to 
“play the ethnic card” at election time, using communal demands to mobilize voters.129   
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Where the people rallied around ethnic identities, simple majoritarian democracy is 
doomed to fail. Horowitz (1985) describes the conditions under simple majority rule as 
follows:  
Ethnic parties as developed majorities took power and minorities took 
shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority 
exclusion from government underpinned by ethnic voting was potentially 
permanent...Civil violence, military coups, and the advent of single party 
regimes can all be traced to the problem of exclusion and inclusion.130 
Due to the shortcomings and unexpected consequences of simple majority rule in 
ethnically divided societies, a power-sharing approach has emerged as a possible 
electoral design. The term power-sharing has been defined by Arend Lipjhart as a set of 
principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every 
significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision-making 
abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the 
group.131 
In this chapter, I argue that arrangements in the political space with regard to 
representation in the electoral system will affect the potential for ethnic conflict. 
Furthermore, in multiethnic societies, certain electoral systems can successfully manage 
ethnic tension through political participation. In this context, while there is widespread 
agreement on the importance of electoral systems in shaping the wider political arena, 
there is profound disagreement among political scientists as to which electoral systems 
are most appropriate for divided societies.132  In this study, I argue that consociational 
democracy is the ideal power-sharing arrangement for multiethnic nations. The most 
important advantage of consociational democracy over other power-sharing alternatives 
is that it has been successfully implemented in many countries, including Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Malaysia (1955–1969), and Lebanon (1943–1975). 
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A. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
Consociational democracy promotes proportional representation to ensure that 
minorities are heard. Political representation is widely seen as the most common way to 
ensure that government represents the interests of the minority as well as the majority. In 
terms of electoral systems, consociationalists argue that party-list proportional 
representation is the best choice for divided societies, as it enables all significant ethnic 
groups, including minorities, to “define themselves” into ethnically based parties and to 
gain representation in the parliament in proportion to their numbers in the community as 
a whole.133  
Consociationalsim, above all, relies on elite cooperation as a principal 
characteristic of conflict management in deeply divided societies.134 There are four 
fundamental requirements for consociational democracies to work. First, elites must have 
power to accommodate their people. Second, the elites from one group must be willing to 
work with elites from other groups. Third, elites must be committed to the cause of 
democracy and willing to work to ensure its survival. Finally, the elites must accept and 
understand the problems that will arise in the case of fragmentation. (Lijphart 1969).  
 The mechanics of consociationalism can be distilled into the four basic elements 
that must be present to make a constitution worthy of the consociational name.135 They 
are: (i) executive power-sharing among representatives of all significant groups (grand 
coalition); (ii) high degree of internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it 
(segmental autonomy); (iii) proportional representation and proportional allocation of 
civil service positions and public funds (proportionality); and (iv) a minority veto on the 
most vital issues (mutual veto).136  
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 The four principles of consociational democracy provide an overarching umbrella 
for all ethnic parties, unlike the adversarial nature of majority democracies. These 
principles are briefly discussed below: 
1. Grand Coalition 
The primary characteristic of consociational democracy is that the political 
leaders of all significant segments of a plural society cooperate in a grand coalition to 
govern the country.137 The leaders of the ethnic groups recognize the dangers of non-
cooperation.  
Grand coalitions can occur either in the cabinet or in the parliamentary system, in 
“grand councils,” or as a grand coalition of a president and senior executive in the 
presidential system.138 In the Austrian case, the grand coalition cabinet that ruled the 
country from 1945 to 1966 induced a careful balance between two overwhelmingly 
strong parties representing the Catholic and socialist segments.139 But in the case of 
Belgium and the Netherlands, grand coalitions were formed in permanent or ad hoc 
councils and committees, that formally had an advisory function but with actuality often 
had a decisive influence.140  
Another relatively new coalition, which ended four long decades of violence in 
Northern Ireland and came to life after long-lasting negotiations, is known as the Good 
Friday Peace Agreement of April 1998. The Ulster Unionist (UUP-Protestant), 
Progressive Unionist (PUP-Protestant), Social Democratic, and Labor Party (SDLP-
Catholic) all came together to form a coalition.  
2. Segmental Autonomy 
The idea of segmental authority is to delegate rule-making and rule-applying 
powers to individual ethnic groups. According to Lijphart, there are decisions that require 
the consensus of all ethnic groups and decisions that concern only a single ethnic group/ a 
segment of the entire population. On all matters of common interest, decisions should be 
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made by all segments together, with a roughly proportional degree of influence, whereas, 
on all other matters, the decisions and their execution can be left to the separate segments 
(Lijphart, 1977). As I touched upon in previous chapters, in the realm of cultural affairs, 
segmental autonomy in Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands has become quite 
extensive.141 
3. Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality rests at the heart of consociational democracy. 
Proportionality, as opposed to majority rule, is important for two reasons. First, it is a 
method of allocating financial and other governmental resources. More importantly, 
proportionality ensures that, through the electoral system, ethnic group demographics are 
reflected in parliamentary or executive branch representation. 
In Belgium, the reforms of 1970 established a well-designed consociational 
democracy. The government (council of members) had to have an equal number of 
Flemish- and French-speaking ministers; the same rule applied to the highest courts, to 
the important Permanent Language commission, and to the upper ranks of the armed 
forces.142 In Belgium, representation at the federal level parallels the demographic 
characteristics of the population. After recommendations by the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism concerning civil service, representation of French-
speaking minorities increased to 24 percent in 1974, tough it had been only 13 percent in 
1953.143 
4. Mutual Veto 
Participation in a political coalition does not guarantee the protection of ethnic 
minorities since, even in the “grand coalitions,” decisions are made with the approval of a 
majority. A mutual or minority veto ensures that at the point at which a vital interest of an 
ethnic group is at stake, it will not be simply outvoted by the majority. While the minority 
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veto gives minorities the right to prevent action by others on the most sensitive issues, 
such as language, education, or cultural rights, it also serves a more important  
overriding goal, “the power of protecting itself.”144 
The mutual veto can be based on formalized rules or traditional informal 
practices.145 The Netherlands and Switzerland offer examples of the informal application 
of veto.146 In Belgium, where the veto was once an informal principle, a law amended the 
constitution to ensure that laws affecting the cultural and educational interests of 
language groups can be passed only if majorities of both the Dutch-speaking and the 
French-speaking parliamentary representatives give their approval. 
These four basic elements of consociational democracy guarantee that the 
formation of the executive and legislative branches will include each ethnic group with 
respect to its demographic power, unlike the adversarial nature of the simple majority-
rule democracy. Furthermore, Lijphart consistently asserts that consociationalism is the 
only viable option for democracy in divided societies:  
For many plural societies of the non-Western world, the realistic choice is 
not between the British (majoritarian) model of democracy and the 
consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no 
democracy at all.147 
The great value of consociational democracy is that it offers a powerful conflict-
resolving solution to those divided societies that show no hope of generating any inter-
ethnic political accommodation.148 But on the other hand, consociationalism offers few 
incentives for ethnic leaders to appeal for support beyond their own ethnic bases.149 In 
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short, Table 2 summarizes the characteristics, ethos, institutions promoted, and principles 
of the consociational democracy. 150 
 
 Consociational Democracy 
Characteristics Ethnic leaders form coalitions after elections. 
Strengths Provides ethnic groups with guarantees for the protection of their interests. 
Weakness Highly dependent on the choices of the ethnic leaders. They may pursue either conflict or moderation.  
Institutions 
Parliamentary government. 
Proportional representation of seats. 
Proportional representation of electoral systems. 
Table 2.   Consociational Democracy 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
 Power-sharing systems, if successfully implemented, will decrease group status 
concerns, increase incentives for groups to cooperate with each other, and give a voice to 
all ethnic groups in the country.151 Introducing democracy and maintaining the balance of 
power between different ethnic groups in a highly combustible environment is not a 
simple task. However, power-sharing systems offer tested examples of success where 
multiethnic peace has been sustained in different parts of the world. In fact, any incentive 
for maintaining peace that does not include the possibility of reengineering the political 
domain will be neither complete nor successful. Thus, redistribution of political power by 
power-sharing arrangements is the fourth and last tool of the four-fold framework 
discussed here. 
 The four-fold framework is derived by analyzing the implications and 
ramifications of governmental policies on the outcome of both ongoing and past ethnic 
conflicts around the world. This framework provides us valuable tools to understand how 
particular governments reacted in the case of ethnic conflict and how well those choices 
performed under certain circumstances. 
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 Now it is time to test our model in an ongoing conflict. Iraq, with its considerable 
multiethnic and multireligious diversity in this context and time, offers a relevant case on 
which to apply the four-fold framework and see how well it performs. Thus, in the next 
chapter, we turn to Iraq as a case study. 
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VII. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK: PRESENT DAY IRAQ 
“How can multiethnic Iraq survive and, additionally, govern, defend, and sustain 
itself?” This is a timely and legitimate question. Since the invasion of Iraq, both the 
interim Iraqi government and those elected Iraqi governments that have followed, have 
adopted policies employed to stabilize and help the desired Iraqi end state, “a 
constitutional, representative Iraqi government that respects civil rights and has security 
forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from safe haven from 
terrorists,” have been unsuccessful.152 However, as of December 2006, these have been 
unsuccessful. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias have contributed to 
growing sectarian strife, resulting in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and 
displaced individuals.153  
The framework developed in this study is intended to provide an independent 
alternative model to achieve ethnic peace in Iraq. Iraq, with its multiethnic and multi-
religious nature, is indeed an invaluable test ground for new ideas and innovative policies 
A. BACKGROUND 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the following regime change in Iraq stimulated 
worldwide awareness of long-standing animosities between the country’s Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslim populations, as well as deep divisions between the Arab majority and the Kurd 
populations in the northern parts of the country.154 Ethnic and religious conflict is not 
new to the region. Understanding religious and ethnic diversity and the complexities 
associated with it will help us to employ the framework. 
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Figure 6.   Ethnic and Religious Distribution in Iraq155 
 
The religious and ethnic diversity of the country can be easily seen on the map in 
Figure 6. Religious diversity in particular is the one which is difficult for many outsiders 
to appreciate. Muslims make up 96 percent of Iraq’s population, but they are divided 
among different sects of Islam. A majority of Iraqis, about 60 to 65 percent of the 
nation’s Muslims, adhere to Shi’a.156 They live mostly in the southern part of the country 
and control the most productive agricultural region as well as Basra, an important oil-
refining center.  
Sunni Muslims in Iraq constitute 35 to 40 percent of the overall Muslim 
population.157 They live mostly in the central and western parts of the country. Contrary 
to the general perception, Baghdad is not a Sunni-dominated city. There are a significant 
number of Shiites, as well as Kurds and Turkmen, in the capital. 
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The country is also divided on the basis of ethnicity. Notably, there are three 
distinct ethnic groups in the country: Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Ethnically, about 75 
percent of the population is Arab.158 The Arabs include virtually all of the Shiite 
population and most of the Sunni Muslims of central Iraq. Kurds, most of whom practice 
Sunni Islam and are considered distinct in both ethnicity and language, form the largest 
ethnic minority, constituting 15 to 20 percent of the Iraqi population.159 Turkmen, 
descendants of ancient Turkic tribes, are the third-largest ethnic group in Iraq at over 
two-million strong. The majority of the Turkmen population is in the crucial city of 
Kirkuk.160 
Although Iraq is an oil-rich country with substantial resources, this has not 
brought peace and stability to the people since its inception. Arab nationalist 
governments, particularly the Ba’ath regime that has dominated Iraq since 1964, tried to 
subordinate Iraq’s Shiite and Kurdish communities and impose an unwanted identity on 
them—policies that led to repeated conflicts.161 
Iraq came into existence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World 
War I. Ever since the British rulers installed the Hashemite Faizal of Hijaz, the leader of 
the Arab forces who fought against the Ottoman armies, as King of Iraq, ethnicity and 
sectarianism have been at the heart of every political movement in Iraq.162 New rulers of 
Iraq, dominated by the Sunni Arab elite, were always concerned with the multiethnic and 
multi-religious nature of the newly independent country.163 In stark contrast to the 
Ottoman Empire, the new regime envisioned the compulsory assimilation of the different 
minorities—in fact, a large majority of the population—into the mainstream of Arabism 
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and, implicitly, Sunni Islam, which was regarded as the centerpiece of the nation’s 
cultural heritage and its foremost contribution to world history.164  
The rise of Pan-Arabism to the status of a national ideology and the Arabization 
of the army, government, and administration were contested from the beginning.165 
Being excluded from power on the basis of their ethno-religious background, resistance 
formed along these lines and also gave rise to an ever more articulated Kurdish 
nationalism and a politicized Shiism.166 Shiites have rebelled against the successive 
central governments since the 1930s. In each and every uprising, they were brutally 
punished by those governments. Thousands lost their lives. Millions were forced to 
move. Leaders of Shiite tribes were executed. This method was used by the Ba’ath party 
in order to intimidate Shiites within the country. Most notably after the 1991 Gulf War, 
on March 3, an Iraqi tank commander retreating from Kuwait fired a shell through one of 
the portraits of Saddam Hussein in Basra’s main square and triggered a Shiite uprising. 
The consequences were devastating. Hussein’s forces leveled the historical centers of the 
Shiite towns, bombarded sacred Shiite shrines, and executed thousands on the spot. By 
some estimates, 100,000 people died in reprisal killings between March and September 
1991.167 
Like the Shiites, the Kurds in the north suffered their share of brutality from the 
regime in Baghdad over the years. They revolted against the central government in 1932, 
1940, 1958, and 1975. The last Kurdish uprising against the Ba’athist regime came 
during the Iran-Iraq War. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the punishment inflicted by the 
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gassing of the Kurdish town of Halabja, in retaliation for residents’ sympathy for the 
Kurdish movement and Iran, became a symbol of the genocidal character of the so-called 
Anfal168 campaign. 
Since the invasion, contrary to many expectations, ethnic and religious division 
divide has not closed but widened. For the first time in the history of Iraq, without 
government support, people have been targeting other ethnic and religious groups all over 
the country. Although an elected government, with the help of the United States and the 
international community, was formed to govern, sustain, and, most importantly, secure 
the country, leaders of all ethnic and religious groups have presented their unwillingness 
to dismantle non-governmental powers like the Mahdi army, the Sunni insurgency, and 
the Kurdish peshmerga. According to the United Nations,169 daily reports of inter-
communal intimidation and murder discuss the numbers of bodies of Sunni and Shi’a 
men found to be tortured and summarily executed in Baghdad and its surrounding 
areas.170  
B. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK 
The intent of this chapter is to take an objective snapshot of the current situation 
in Iraq as of December 2006 and apply the four-fold framework developed in this study. 
Each tool in the framework is discussed separately. Disequilibrium between proposed 
policy tools and the current situation on the ground are highlighted and recommendations 
are made accordingly. 
1. Population Control 
I will never believe in differences between people. I am a Sunni and my 
wife is a Shi‘a. I received threats to divorce her or be killed. We left Dora 
[a once-mixed neighborhood in Baghdad] now. My wife is staying with 
her family in Sha‘b [a Shi‘a neighborhood] and I am staying with my 
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friends in Mansur [a Sunni neighborhood]. I am trying to find a different 
house but it’s difficult now to find a place that accepts both of us in 
Baghdad.171 
—A young Iraqi artist, Baghdad, June 2006 
 
When the U.S.-led coalition conquered the Iraqi regime in May 2003172, all 
mechanisms of government and the state collapsed with it. The vast majority of the 
military, as well as police, ministries, and other authorities disappeared virtually 
overnight. Civil servants did not turn up for work anymore and their offices were 
systemically looted and even burned down.173  
Since June 2003, overall security conditions have deteriorated and grown more 
complex, as evidenced by an increased number of attacks and more recent Sunni/Shi’a 
sectarian strife after the 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara.174 As a result of 
the vacuum created due to the lack of a security structure, the development of political 
and security institutions have been lagging behind. At this point in time in Iraq, people 
from all ethnic and religious groups have become more and more suspicious of the 
central government’s ability to control their neighborhoods and provide security. More 
people, even elected officials within the central government, have been expressing 
support for the Mahdi army, the Badr organization, various Sunni resistance groups, and 
the Kurdish peshmerga. 
Taken altogether, it is clear that the road to a governable Iraq is through, first and 
foremost, securing its people. Hence, through the application of “population control” 
policies, there are two recommendations to be made for successful management of these 
security problems: 
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a. Building National Security Forces 
The government of Iraq should build up its security forces—both national 
army and police—on the basis of ethnic and religious inclusiveness, with members of 
Iraq’s various communities distributed across the hierarchies of those forces, as well as 
within governorates.175 However, recruiting, training, and organizing Iraq’s security 
forces in the middle of an ongoing crisis is akin to rebuilding a truck while driving it. It is 
not such an easy task. 
There are serious challenges to forming and deploying security forces that 
need to be addressed. First, in the face of the enemy, it is always harder to appeal to 
people to participate in security structures. Iraqi leaders at every level must be 
encouraged to step forward and take the lead. Those who do so must also be rewarded. 
Although the presence of coalition forces mitigates any immediate external threats, Iraqis 
are the ones who are going to secure their country and maintain internal peace. Every 
single day, the Iraqi government should make significant efforts to enable its national 
security forces to shoulder more of the load for their own security. 
Second, the composition of Iraq’s security forces is also extremely 
important to stabilizing the security situation in Iraq. Ideally, Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites, and 
Turkmen should be proportionally represented within the police and security forces. So 
far, Sunni participation in the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) has not risen to the desired 
number. After the January 30, 2005, transitional parliamentary elections, some Sunni 
clerics issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling on Sunni males to enlist in the ISF. There 
was even a major U.S. effort to recruit Sunnis following the election. Only several 
thousand Sunnis answered the call.176 Moreover, in a series of town hall meetings across 
several Sunni provinces, Sunnis have expressed their desire that, rather than working with 
existing ISF units, they be allowed to raise their own tribal militias.177 
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Moreover, the few Sunnis who participate in the ISF are viewed as 
collaborators with the occupation forces. They and their families are becoming victims of 
their fellow Sunnis. In 2005, the ISF police force in Ramadi dissolved after Iraqi officers 
failed to show up for work after a number of insurgent attacks against them. Sunni police 
forces also collapsed in Mosul and Fallujah during clashes with insurgents in November 
2004.178 
Third, the question of where and how this newly formed security structure 
will operate is another point of concern. Will the ISF operate in Kurdish-controlled 
northern Iraq? Will a Shiite-dominated security force be professional enough to handle a 
volatile security situation in the Sunni-dominated province of Ramadi?  
These questions demonstrate serious challenges for the way ahead. 
Without ensuring that every single individual wearing the ISF uniform will serve for 
greater good well being of the entire nation rather than serving only their own 
ethnic/religious constituencies, efforts to secure Iraq will be futile. There are early signs 
of this movement on the ground. During the recent parliamentary elections of December 
2005, some Shiite soldiers wore posters bearing the image of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr on their chests or fastened them to the ends of raised AK-47 assault rifles.179 In the 
past, other units have displayed images of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani on the backs of 
their pickup trucks while serving in Baghdad.180 
b. Disband Militias and Peshmerga 
Every single day almost a hundred Iraqis become victims of violence at 
the hands of the sectarian militias. Unfortunately, there are serious concerns that at least 
some of the militias, are tied to political parties within the current government. Under the 
shadow of these armed groups and other governmental security forces, security can never 
be established in Iraq. Recently the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq plainly expressed his 
concern and hopes for the future in Iraq: 
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As this institutional foundation is strengthened, the Iraqi government will 
be in a position to reestablish the state’s monopoly on force. The need to 
demobilize unauthorized armed groups, including militias, is a critical part 
of it. 
Despite repeated U.S. requests for them to disband, Iraq’s various ethnic 
and sectarian militias continue to exist and, in some cases, are on the path to being 
recognized as part of Iraq’s security apparatus.181 For example, on June 8, 2006, Iraqi 
President Jalal Talabani praised an Iran-trained Shiite militia known as the Badr 
organization and the Kurdish peshmerga security forces.182 
One of the militia forces operating in Iraq is the peshmerga in northern 
Iraq. According to some estimates, there are more than 100,000 Kurdish peshmerga in the 
region. Despite increasing pressure from the central government of Iraq and the United 
States, Kurdish leaders in the north have refused to disband their forces. According to 
Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, one of the two main Kurdish 
parties, “We want to keep our peshmerga because they are a symbol of resistance...it’s 
not a matter to be discussed or negotiated.”183 In addition to that, they have requested 
that the ISF operate in northern Iraq only with the consent of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. 
The Shiites have two distinct militia organizations in Iraq. In Shiite-
dominated southern Iraq, the Badr organization, controlled by the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), is believed to be responsible for most of the sectarian 
violence in the country.184 When U.S. forces discovered a series of covert prisons 
allegedly run by Shiite members of ISF, investigators uncovered evidence that the  
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prisoners were mostly Sunni Arabs and had been tortured at clandestine facilities.185 The 
Badr organization is the largest political party in Iraq and is unofficially policing most of 
southern Iraq.  
In contrast to the Badr organization, the Mahdi army refused to take part 
directly in the government. The Mahdi army, controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr with tacit 
U.S. and coalition approval, controls Sadr City, a Baghdad slum of some 2.5 million 
Shiites. The Mahdi army has reportedly formed police units called “punishment 
committees,” which harass civilians suspected of flouting Islamic law or their 
authority.186 According to one U.S. military officer, “the Mahdi army’s got the Iraqi 
police and Badr’s got the commandos...Everybody’s got their own death squads.”187 
Finally, it is clear that as long as Iraqi government cannot establish a 
monopoly over the armed forces operating within the country, security and stability will 
not flourish in Iraq. Some experts question any possible allegiance to a national 
government because recruits are exclusively drawn from sectarian or ethnic communities, 
whether Shiite, Sunni, or Kurd.188 With the existence of armed militia groups, there is 
only one unfortunate end for Iraq: civil war. 
2. Winning Hearts and Minds 
Keep back 50m or deadly force will be applied. 
—Bilingual notices affixed to the rear bumpers of U.S. military vehicles in 
Iraq.189 
Immediately after Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled in May 2003, a number 
of Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites started to search for loved ones who had been killed by the 
brutal regime and buried in mass graves. The Shiites and Kurds were not the only the 
victims, as some Sunnis were slaughtered by their fellow Sunnis. 
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For over 20 years the Ba’ath regime systematically executed, tortured, raped, 
terrorized, and repressed all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. Thus, any governmental 
policy towards establishing ethnic and religious peace in Iraq must address the hearts and 
minds of the Iraqi people. Although reconciliation after suffering and losing loved ones 
has never been easy, Iraqis have to shake hands with whoever wants to build a free and 
democratic country in the region. 
It is self-evident that Iraq needs a thorough reconciliation project. Therefore, it is 
safe to argue that the second tool of the four-fold framework, “winning hearts and minds” 
holds true for Iraq. Now I will discuss some possible psychological and structural 
initiatives for Iraq. 
a. Psychological Initiatives 
None of the censuses performed in Iraq were conducted with neutral 
international observers. Therefore, census results cannot be verified despite the fact that 
the information derived from these censuses is essential for ensuring a fair distribution of 
services and governmental representation.  
Since the formation of the new unity government in Iraq, for the first time 
in the history of the country, political power and economic resources are about to be 
shared according to demographic figures. However, there are conflicting reports about 
the demographics of Iraq. Other than Kurds and Arabs, there are other distinct ethnic 
groups, such as Turkmen, Armenians, and Assyrians. Even today, Iraq’s two largest 
ethnic groups do not agree on their demographic figures. Hence, as soon as the security 
situation improves, a neutral census under the scrutiny of the international community 
must be held so that demographic facts may be firmly established.  
On the other hand, on October 15, 2005, Iraqis had their first chance since 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to decide for themselves the basics of their government 
by casting their votes on a constitution. The new constitution recognizes the ethnic facts 
on the ground. Article 3 of the new constitution states:  
Iraq is a country of many nationalities, religions, and sects, and is a part of 
the Islamic world, is a founding and active member of the Arab League, 
and is committed to its covenant.  
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In that regard, the new Iraqi constitution offers more freedoms to its 
citizens than any other Arab country in the region. However, these policies should not be 
relegated to paper and forgotten. They should be implemented fairly to all ethnic groups 
in the country. 
In addition to that, justice and truth are fundamental principles in 
establishing a culture of reconciliation within Iraq. The Iraqi government should emplace 
a fair system and a rule of law above all ethnic and religious groups. The new 
constitution addresses these long-awaited desires of the Iraqi people.  
Article 19 states: 
Every person has the right to be treated with justice in judicial and 
administrative proceedings… 
Moreover, in order to alleviate the suffering of millions of Iraqis, former 
regime leaders who committed crimes against humanity must be brought to justice. To 
that end, a new national reconciliation plan announced by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouari al-
Malaki holds the former regime’s top officials accountable.190 Although it is too late to 
bring back the fathers, sons, and the many innocents killed by the Ba’ath regime, 
bringing to justice those who committed the crimes will help Iraqis to comprehend the 
shift Iraq is taking. 
Justice and truth must also hold for the post-Saddam environment. 
Recently, U.S. forces and the ISF have discovered secret prisons where mostly Sunni 
men were held and tortured. It should be made clear that no criminal will be protected by 
the government. These incidents came to light when some Sunnis voiced their concerns 
about Shi’a militia infiltration of the ISF. In the meantime, the fact that the Interior 
Ministry, which oversees the ISF, is controlled by a Shiite politician is adding fuel to the 
fire. Regarding this argument, Sarah Leah Wilson, director of Human Rights Watch’s 
Middle East division has said: 
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Evidence suggests that Iraqi security forces are involved in these horrific 
crimes, and thus far the government has not held them accountable. The 
Iraqi government must stop giving protection to security forces 
responsible for abduction, torture, and murder. 
These are serious allegations that require serious attention. Otherwise, 
there will not be any difference between Saddam’s regime and the new ones except for a 
change in who is oppressed. Therefore, those who have committed crimes must be held 
accountable. 
Last but not least, national, tribal, and religious leaders must promote 
unity and peace. However, in the summer of 2006, Kurdish regional leader Massoud 
Barzani provoked controversy by refusing to fly the Iraqi flag above official buildings, 
arguing that Kurds view the flag as a symbol of the former regime.191 Yet, Sunnis and 
Shiites in Iraq, view this is as a betrayal of Arab unity and the sacrifices made during the 
Iran-Iraq war.192 
In contrast to the Kurdish leadership, who distance themselves from Iraq 
at every opportunity, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most revered Shiite leader in 
Iraq, has consistently been issuing fatwas that denounce violence and sectarian conflict 
while promoting moderation in Iraq. In his advice to Muslims living in non-Muslim 
lands, he emphasizes respect for other religious and cultural traditions, along with a 
strong emphasis on maintaining Muslim values. The new national unity government 
should encourage voices of reconciliation and moderation to announce fatwas to gain and 
maintain population support for the government. 
b. Structural Initiatives 
Sunni dominance of the regime over several decades also caused 
disequilibrium in access to governmental services. The new unity government needs to 
address the redistribution of public services and cultural/language rights while also 
rehabilitating decades of mismanagement.  
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The new Iraqi constitution promises a fresh start towards reconciling the 
expectations of the different groups. After many weeks of squabbling and protracted 
negotiations between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites, the historic document was declared the 
law of the land on October 15, 2005, in what Talabani, the President of Iraq, 
characterized as “a vital step toward restoring law and order in this war-torn nation.” 
According to Article 4 of the new constitution: 
The Arabic language and Kurdish language are the two official languages 
of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, 
such as Turkmen, Syriac and Armenian, in government educational 
institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other 
language in private educational institutions, is guaranteed.193 
Furthermore, the constitution also acknowledges that the Turkmen and 
Syriac language are also official languages in areas where their speakers constitute a 
certain percentage of the population. Each region or governorate may adopt any other 
local language as an additional official language if the majority of its population so 
decides in a general referendum. 
However, there is a lot of work yet to be done toward the economic 
reconstruction of the country. Wars, internal conflicts, and international embargoes have 
had dramatic effects, causing hardships for the entire population. No single group is 
significantly better off than the others. The overall conditions, in terms of the availability 
of electricity and water, are worrisome. Even early on a June morning, the temperature 
can reach 130°F in the southern Shiite town of Samawah.194 Electricity and water 
shortages are not only deteriorating security conditions but, more importantly, eroding 
confidence in the national unity government.  
Understandably, there are high expectations among Iraqis after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Lieutenant General David Petraeus calls it the “man on the 
moon” syndrome: “If America can put a man on the moon, it certainly can get me 24/7 
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electricity.”195 In fact, the availability of electricity in the capital remains below the 
prewar levels, at 8.1 hours per day.196 This fuels tension among ordinary Iraqis because, 
before the invasion, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein often used electricity distribution to 
reward friends and punish enemies. Hence, the national unity government should 
precipitate efforts to provide the basic needs of modern life to every corner of the country 
as soon as possible. The longer the country stays in the dark, the harder it will become to 
win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. 
Last but not least, one of the significant decisions the national unity 
government has to make concerns oil revenues. Iraq’s key source of revenue is oil. This 
commodity accounts for 90 percent or more of the country’s exports.197 Continuous 
demands by the Kurdish minority to include the oil-rich city of Kirkuk under their control 
is only one indication of the sensitivity of the issue.198 While oil resources and revenues 
can complicate Iraq’s political transition, they can also assist the country’s long-term 
stability and unity by giving all Iraqis a stake in the country’s future and supporting the 
development of a middle class that transcends ethnic divisions.199   
The new Iraqi constitution has addressed these concerns. Article 110 of 
the constitution states: 
“Oil and gas are the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions 
and governorates.” 
Finally, the national unity government should not let oil revenues be 
allocated along ethnic lines. The management and distribution of oil revenues have been 
daunting tasks in many oil-rich countries but Iraq faces additional challenges. 
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Governmental policies regarding oil revenues need to be tailored by appreciating the fact 
that there would be no difference between dividing oil revenues and dividing Iraq. 
3. Strengthening National Identity 
Despite having a long history as a civilization, the feasibility of an overarching 
national identity as Iraq is widely questioned by many scholars. In 1933, Iraq’s first ruler, 
King Faisal I, lamented: “There is still no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of 
human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with many religious traditions, and 
absurdities connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and 
perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever.”200 
If a sense of Iraqi national identity does exist, this does not override communal 
forms of identity along ethnic, geographic, tribal or religious boundaries.201 The 
importance of ethnic and religious affiliation in defining identity is becoming more and 
more visible everyday. If one reads or watches news about Iraq at any give time, one will 
see how often religious or ethnic affiliations are attached to elected Iraqi leaders, such as 
the Shi’a prime minister of Iraq or the Kurdish president of Iraq.  
All the former constitutions have specified the Arabization of Iraq as the 
domineering characteristic, and this has characterized its identity from a historical 
perspective. Decades of brutality under Saddam Hussein’s regine have eroded, but not 
destroyed, the sense of Iraqi identity formed only in the 20th century. Ethnic identity now 
plays a much stronger role in Iraq than it once did, mainly because of the regime’s 
favoritism towards the Sunni minority and its repression of Kurdish and Shi’a 
rebellions202 
Like most social phenomena, national identity is not immune from evolution due 
to changing demographics. It is suggested that all national identities are subject to debate 
and disagreement but, in a more profound way, those identities are especially in play 
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when states are undergoing traumatic reorganization.203 The national unity government 
of Iraq, in its reconciliation efforts, needs to create an overarching and inclusive national 
identity, where people can still be Turkmen, Kurd, Shiite, or Sunni but, at the same time, 
a proud Iraqis. 
In Iraq, it seems not neither language nor religion could be part of an identity-
hardening effort. The sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shiite is, at least for now, 
difficult to manage. Although in the very first article of the constitution, Islam is defined 
as the official religion of the state and its foundation of source of legislation, the sectarian 
divide between Sunni and Shiite hardly makes Islam a factor of national cohesion. 
Instead, reforming an outdated and propaganda-filled educational system that aimed to 
train foot soldiers rather than citizens, and promulgating the new constitution and the 
values embedded in it could be likely points of unification for all Iraqis. 
First, renewing Iraq’s educational system is vital because Iraqi youth will 
determine their country’s future. Currently, there are madrasas in the south that mostly 
teach Islamic theology, a quasi-independent educational system in the north, and a small 
number of secular institutions throughout the country. All of them have different 
characteristics and curricula. Decisions to reform a curriculum must be strictly focused 
on Iraqi identity and in line with Iraqi values and culture. This would enlighten a 
religious upbringing, and instill the establishment of and appreciation for the values of 
democracy, free speech, human rights, social cohesion, equality, and tolerance. 
Part of the curriculum reform and development will require a review of textbooks. 
Since 1973, when Saddam Hussein ordered all school history to be rewritten from the 
Ba’ath Party perspective, children have been taught that Iraq was triumphant in all wars 
and that Saddam Hussein single-handedly defended the Arab world against greedy 
Zionism.204 Now, it is time to rewrite the textbooks to promote understanding among all 
ethnic and religious groups in Iraq and to free them from hostile references to others. 
Second, the new Iraqi constitution, which was ratified by a wide margin on 
October 15, 2005, opened a new chapter for all Iraqis. As a whole, it brings a definition 
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to Iraqi national identity. Article 3 of the new constitution states that: “Iraq is a country 
of multiple nationalities and religious sects. It is a founding and acting member in the 
Arab League and is committed to its charter and its part of Islamic world.” 
Furthermore, the new constitution calls for unprecedented basic human rights and 
public freedoms for all Iraqis. All Iraqis are equal before the law regardless of gender, 
race, color, opinion, religion, sect, or belief and discrimination based on these differences 
is prohibited. So, the question of what makes an Iraqi an Iraqi has been defined in a 
totally different way than it was before. Since the ratification of the new constitution, the 
Iraqi people are bound together by promising future of its constitution. The national unity 
government should place the promulgation of the new constitution and the values 
embedded within it at the center of restructuring a new Iraqi identity. It should do so 
because, from now on, unlike any neighbors except Turkey, the people of Iraq have the 
right to cast votes, and to protest, and the power to make changes if not satisfied. 
Another unorthodox way to strengthen Iraqi national identity is to promote the 
ancient and glorious past of Mesopotamia. Although modern Iraq was created after WW 
I, it occupies the territory that historians traditionally consider to be the birthplace of the 
earliest civilizations. This rich past might provide all Iraqis a shared heritage and identity. 
To expand upon the glorious kingdoms of Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria—all of 
which are deeply revered and embraced—can provide a foundation of nationhood for the 
people of Iraq. The national unity government could use symbols of ancient Iraq to 
promote an overarching identity. Simultaneously, archeological studies and national 
museums should be used to consolidate these efforts 
4. Reengineering the Political System  
All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government and all citizens must 
have their rights protected. 
—George W. Bush, February 27, 2003 
 
The last tool of the four-fold model proposes a power-sharing model for Iraq. 
Given the fact that Iraq had a horrible experience under centralized government, a more 
inclusive form of government is a necessary condition for successful reconciliation. A 
majority-rule system is completely out of the question because it risks alienating large 
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minorities, such as the Sunnis and Turkmen, from the political process, as was seen after 
the second general election, which was boycotted by many disaffected Sunnis.205 
For Iraq, I recommend Lijphart’s consociational democracy for two reasons. First, 
on December 15, 2005, Iraqis voted largely along sectarian and ethnic lines in the 
National Assembly election. The United Iraqi Alliance, mostly Shiite, received 41.2 
percent of the vote, which translated into 128 seats in the parliament. The Democratic 
Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan received 21.7 of the votes and consequently gained 53 
seats in the assembly. The Iraqi Accord Front, mainly Sunni Arab, obtained 15.1 percent 
of the vote and thus won 44 seats in the parliament. The remaining 50 seats in the 
parliament were divided among nine other parties, which together received 22 percent of 
the vote. Second, the representation of all ethnic groups through the mechanisms of grand 
coalition, group autonomy as well as proportionality, and mutual veto is likely to be best 
for Iraq in terms of political and civil rights. 
Furthermore, when taking a thorough look into the new Iraqi constitution and how 
parliamentary seats were assigned in the December 15, 2005, election, one can see the 
implementation of mechanisms of consociational democracy.  
Under the newly adopted constitution of Iraq, the Presidency Council of Iraq, the 
Prime Minister of Iraq, and the Cabinet must have the support of two-thirds, or 184 
members, of the Iraqi National Assembly. However, no ethnic or sectarian party in the 
parliament has enough seats to form a government on its own. Thus, the formation of a 
government requires a grand coalition across major political parties.  
The national unity government took office May 20, 2006, with parliamentary 
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 Political Parties Seats 
1 United Iraqi Alliance  113 
2 Kurdistani Alliance 53 
3 Iraqi Accord Front 44 
4 Iraqi National List 25 
5 The Upholders of the Messa 2 
6 Iraqi Turkmen Fr 1 
7 National Rafidain List 1 
TOTAL 240 
Table 3.   Political Parties of the Grand Coalition in Iraqi Government 
 
Table 3 clearly shows that the political leaders of almost all significant ethnic and 
religious groups came together to govern Iraq, recognizing the dangers of non-
cooperation. 
Segmental autonomy is the second mechanism of consociational democracy. 
Decentralization of government is hardly a radical idea for Iraq. The Iraqi constitution 
already provides for a procedure for provinces to combine into regional governments. 
Chapter V, Authorities of the Regions, of the new Iraqi constitution, which was approved 
by a referendum that took place on October 15, 2005, describes the form of Iraq’s 
federation. It begins by stating that the republic’s federal system is made up of the 
capital, regions, decentralized provinces, and local administrations.  
By dividing power between two levels of government, the constitution gives 
groups greater control over their own political, social, and economic affairs while making 
them feel less exploited as well as more secure. However, segmental autonomy should 
not be understood as a step towards partition. It is a means of building a single, unified, 
and democratic Iraq where all ethnic and religious groups coexist peacefully within a 
single entity. 
Another mechanism of consociational democracy is proportional representation, 
which rests at the heart of the whole power-sharing idea. The implementation of 
proportional representation is highly visible in the design of the legislative election 
system and later in the formation of the Iraqi government.  
Acting under United Nations advice, Iraq adopted a purely proportional 
representation system, within which a party’s share of seats in the National Assembly is 
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determined by its share of the national vote total.207 Under the system of proportional 
representation adopted in Iraq, a successful party need approximately 1/275 of the 
national vote to obtain a representative in the National Assembly.208 In addition to that, 
in the formation of the national unity government of Iraq, key governmental offices were 
allocated according to ethnic and religious concerns. For example, the Presidency 
Council has three members to accommodate Iraq’s three largest groups: Sunni Muslim 
Arabs, Shiite Muslim Arabs, and Kurds. Whereas Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, was reelected as 
President of Iraq, a Sunni, Tariq Al-Hashimi, and a Shiite, Adil Abdul Mahdi, were 
elected as the two Vice Presidents of Iraq.  
The same delicate balance can be seen in the National Assembly speaker 
elections. The assembly elected a prominent Sunni leader, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, as 
the Speaker. Khaled al-Attiyah, a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, and Aref Tayfur, 
a Kurd from the Kurdistani Alliance, were elected as Deputy Speakers. 
However, in contrast to the United States, the main executive office in the Iraqi 
government is the Prime Minister. On May 20, 2006, the Iraqi National Assembly 
approved a cabinet proposed by the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite from the 
United Iraqi Alliance. He has two Deputy Prime Ministers: Bahram Salih, a Kurd from 
the Kurdistani Alliance and Salam al-Zaubai, a Sunni from the Iraqi Accord Front. 
Essentially, the main government offices—the presidency, speaker of the 
parliament, and prime minister—are headed by men from the three different 
ethnic/religious groups in Iraq. It seems that during the formation of the new national 
unity government, pains have been taken to try and fairly distribute the main legislative 
and executive powers among the different constituencies after ratification of the new 
constitution. 
At this point, why Turkmen over two million population strength were 
underrepresented in formation of unity government is an interesting question to raise. 
Prior to the December 15, 2006, elections, Turkish televisions showed thousands of 
Kurds from northern cities of Iraq being brought into Kirkuk. This maneuver was entirely 
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organized and financially supported by the two major Kurdish parties (KDP) Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and (PUK) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.209 Moreover, there are serious 
allegations on conduct of elections in Kirkuk. According to some reports electoral 
commission of Iraq (IECI) had allowed additional 227.000 Kurds, who illegally entered 
the city to register and vote in the elections. After completing the registration processes 
by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), it was noted that since the last 
election of January 30th 2005, there was an average 8.19 percent increase in the number 
of voters in Iraq’s eighteen provinces; however, only in Kirkuk the voter numbers was 
increased to 45 percent.210 The unusual increase was due to the illegal settlements of the 
Kurds encouraged by the KPD and PUK parties to change the demographic components 
of Kirkuk.211 The KDP and PUK intention is to increase the Kurdish population in 
Kirkuk as a preparation method for the referendum which will determine the future of the 
city on January 30, 2007.212 I strongly argue that these Kurdish policies towards 
changing demographics of city of Kirkuk will not bring hope and peace for any of ethnic 
groups in the country. Leaders of ethnic groups should not play with demographic figures 
for the sake of gaining more political representation and economic advantages.  
Last but not least: there is the mutual veto. The new Iraqi constitution ensures that 
no constitutional amendment can be made without the consent of the majority. 
Furthermore, a simple majority is not enough to amend an article to the constitution. 
Also, it cannot be rejected by two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates.213 
Due to the fact that Iraq is divided into 18 governorates, any constitutional amendment 
without sizable minority consent seems unlikely to come to pass in Iraq. Hence, the 
minority veto gives Iraqis the right to prevent action by other dominant ethnic or religious 
groups on the most sensitive issues, like language education and cultural rights. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The future of Iraq is not yet known. Many ideas as to how to secure a peaceful, 
democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East are being floated. The framework 
developed here provides an independent alternative for how to sustain ethnic peace in 
Iraq in the years to come. Although there are discrepancies as to which policies should be 
implemented, most people agree that there are critical challenges ahead for the national 
unity government. 
The security dilemma is the biggest of the challenges confronting Iraq. However, 
the national unity government and the U.S-led coalition have taken a number of steps 
towards sustaining peace and security in the country. Certainly, Iraq will become a stable 
and prosperous nation only if security is established all over the country. The 
government’s inability to stabilize the security situation has led armed militia groups to 
act like legitimate sources of authority in some parts of the country. Armed groups and 
death squads from all ethnic and religious background have proliferated. More 
dangerously, the security dilemma is being played out on the streets of Baghdad, where 
tit for tat sectarian violence has torn the city apart. 
In the meantime, one might argue that violence still reigns over the daily life of 
millions of Iraqis. The government has recognized the problem and has taken and 
continues to take measures to stop the violence. As the U.S. ambassador to Iraq asserted, 
the Iraqi government must reestablish a monopoly on force and demobilize unauthorized 
armed groups in the near future. Hopefully, security problems can be expected to decline 
as Iraq moves toward accommodating the unhappy ethnic groups by means of 
reconciliation and political participation. 
Long after I proposed the “hearts and minds” model for reconciling the 
differences among ethnic and religious groups, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-
Maliki, announced the 24-point National Reconciliation Project before the parliament. A 
country torn by multiple wars and conflicts over three decades needs nothing less than 
reconciliation through an effective hearts-and-minds campaign. However, the structural 
initiatives of this campaign are important as well. The national unity government should 
expend a great deal more effort to make the country more livable than it was in pre-
invasion times. The national unity government should deliver basic humanitarian 
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services, such as food and medical supplies, without regard to ethnic and religious 
considerations. Without this, the Iraqi people will not discern a difference between pre-
invasion and post-invasion Iraq until the next parliamentary elections, which has been the 
hallmark of post-Saddam Iraq. 
The third tool of the four-fold model, which proposes strengthening the national 
identity, seems like the weakest point of the framework in the case of Iraq. The lack of an 
overarching national identity and the nature of language and religion in Iraqi politics 
make it harder to find a common ground for identity-hardening efforts. However, new 
educational policies supported by a national curriculum and the promulgation of the new 
constitution and the values and freedoms embedded in it are considered to be tools for 
rebuilding an overarching Iraqi identity. As in the case of Malaysia, the Iraqi people 
could build the democratic and free country that they have all suffered to establish and 
proudly bequeath it to the next generation of Iraqis. 
Consociational democracy, meanwhile, has already been rooted in Iraq. Iraqi 
leaders, under the advice of the United Nations and the international community, 
restructured the Iraqi political system to enable the participation of all ethnic and 
religious groups. Both the national parliamentary elections and the formation of the 
national unity government of Iraq incorporated the four characteristic mechanisms of 
consociational democracy. Acknowledging all the obstacles and stakes in Iraq, I argue 
that consociational democracy is the only viable option to ensure a democratic unitary 
Iraq. 
At this point in time and history, the Iraqi people and their elected leaders have 
arrived at an important crossroads and a critical juncture. They will either coexist 
together or they will continue to suffer the consequences of not doing so. As Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki has acknowledged, many of the challenges ahead are politically 
driven. The new Iraqi government’s ability to address these challenges will define Iraq’s 
future in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Can governments prevent ethnic conflict through policy development and 
enforcement? Throughout this thesis I have tried to develop to provide tools to prevent 
ethnic conflict. According to Ernest Regehr, almost two-thirds of all political conflicts 
worldwide are ethnic conflicts. Even more striking, 170 million people were killed in 
ethnicity-driven conflicts between 1900 and 1987 worldwide. Yet, although ethnic 
conflict would appear to be a worldwide phenomenon, it is neither the norm nor a certain 
fate in some multiethnic nations.  
A better way of understanding ethnic conflict prevention is to explore the causes 
of conflict. Rather than relegating the causes of conflict to “ancient hatreds,” examining 
these causes in the first place helped me to understand the complexity of the phenomenon 
and to develop the four-fold framework for mitigating the conflict. Of the many different 
theories about the possible causes of ethnic conflict, ranging from financial motives to 
cultural values that glorify feuding, I found that Byman’s theories proved most satisfying. 
Ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and leadership 
behavior have played significant roles in the outbreak of ethnic conflict in many 
countries, ranging from the former Yugoslavia to Malaysia.  
However, understanding the explaining causes of ethnic conflict was not the end 
but the beginning of my study. After defining these causes, I developed a solution in a 
coherent four-fold framework. The framework addresses the selected causes of conflict, 
which are discussed in this study and provide a package of solutions to be applied by 
political decision makers. 
Population control is one of the tools I discussed in the framework. I argued in 
this study that there should be some set of principles to control the dynamics of a 
multiethnic society. However, according to the consensus versus coercion model, the 
degree of population control will vary according to the amount of consensus a country 




provide the required security for society, in countries such as India and Sri Lanka, where 
ethnic relations among different groups are problematic, much deeper control will be 
needed.  
Population control provides security for all parts of society and prevents the 
security dilemma from mobilizing the masses. However, no function of government is 
more sensitive than physical law enforcement. Nothing can turn good citizens against 
government more quickly than militarized police forces that treat populations along 
ethnic lines. Hence, the last point of population control policies is that the formation of 
security forces is as important as the enforcement of policies. 
Later in this study I proposed a model to win the “hearts and minds” of the 
population because I deeply believe that ethnic peace cannot be maintained solely by 
population control policies. Governmental policies should address the psychological and 
structural disequilibrium between the expectations of ethnic groups and governmental 
policies. I argued that in multiethnic societies, these efforts should rest on two pillars: 
psychological initiatives and structural initiatives. Governmental policies need to address 
psychological expectations, such as recognition, equal justice, and leadership behavior, as 
well as eliminate or diminish structural inequalities, such as economic, educational, and 
cultural imbalances. Some of the policies discussed in these initiatives have already been 
used as reconciliation processes by governments in Malaysia, Northern Ireland, and 
Belgium, where they have contributed to moderating ethnic peace. 
In this work, I likewise discussed identity hardening as a governmental policy. 
The reality of our time is that multiethnic states are becoming the norm. However, the 
belief in the importance of the nation-state still persists. Hence, governments around the 
world are directly or indirectly engaging in some form of identity-hardening campaigns. 
Whereas Turkey and Malaysia used education extensively to build a common national 
identity, France used its language to build a national identity. In this study, I discussed 
the idea that strengthening national identity through religion is another notable way to 
achieve cohesion for multiethnic nations. Religion is still an important part of defining 
national identity in both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Beyond those methods, the 
promulgation of national symbols, such as a national flag, a national anthem, and national 
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heroes, are widely used by different countries. Although identity-building tools like 
education, religion, language, and the promulgation of national symbols can be divisive 
in multiethnic societies, through the careful implementation of well-crafted governmental 
policies, they could instead be indispensable tools for building a cohesive national 
identity. 
The last tool of the four-fold framework is reengineering the political system. I 
argue that the arrangement of the political space with regard to representation in the 
electoral system greatly affects the potential of ethnic conflict. In this sense, while there 
is a considerable consensus regarding the importance of the electoral system in shaping 
the wider political arena, there is disagreement among political scientists as to which 
electoral systems are most appropriate for multiethnic nations. I proposed that 
consociational democracy is the ideal power-sharing arrangement in such a situation. My 
reasons are two fold. First, the mechanisms and institutions embedded in consociational 
democracy provide proportional representation and ensure that minority voices are heard 
in the decision making process. Second, the most important advantage of consociational 
democracy over other power-sharing alternatives is that it has been successfully 
implemented in many countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Malaysia (1955–
1969), and Lebanon (1943–1975). 
Finally, I applied my four-fold framework to present day Iraq. There are some 
grave findings as well as some promising ones. Unquestionably, the biggest challenge in 
Iraq is the security dilemma. The security situation is a complicated problem. Militias, 
peshmerga, deaths squads, the political will of governmental officials and outsiders are 
some of the factors. Taken altogether, it is clear that the way to a governable Iraq is, first 
and foremost, through securing its people. I recommended that the Iraqi government 
disband all unofficial militias and build its national security forces immediately.  
On the other hand, the December 15, 2005, election and the formation of the 
national unity government were two other important steps toward building a governable 




already been rooted in Iraq. Both the national parliamentary elections and the formation 
of the national unity government of Iraq incorporated the four mechanisms of 
consociational democracy.  
In the future, this framework could be applied to other ethnic conflicts in order to 
test it further. This will help us to understand how the four-fold framework performs in 
different conflicts and with different cultures. However, we had better keep in mind that 
those policies should be implemented with a strong determination to see results. 
Another future study in this area would be examining the ability of non-
governmental agencies to prevent ethnic conflict. What do they offer to governments? 
Could they become power brokers in places where grievances are hard to bridge? I asked 
these questions, because in today’s world, civic leaders have become significant players 
in both domestic and international politics. 
In sum, the four-fold framework is aimed at preventing ethnic conflict in 
multiethnic societies. It provides a coherent and consistent recipe for policymakers. 
However, any kind of government policies dealing with ethnic conflict have to be 
strongly supported and implemented by all sector of government. Ethnic leaders must set 
aside their differences and see the dangers of non-cooperation. Keeping financial costs 
and human losses in mind, every effort to prevent ethnic conflict is worth exploring. 
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